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ABSTRACT
A Multi-Scalar Socio-Policy Analysis of Resource Reallocation and Water Security in
Twenty-first Century Utah, USA
by
Clint P. Carney, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2022
Major Professor: Dr. Joanna Endter-Wada
Department: Environment and Society
The western United States is confronting multiple scarcity-driven water
insecurities in the 21st Century. Use of marketing mechanisms to reallocate existing
supplies is often promoted as a less costly and more environmentally conscious approach
to address water scarcity than traditional supply augmentation measures. Yet, water
marketing has faced numerous socio-economic and institutional obstacles. To overcome
these challenges, water banks have institutionalized the marketing process in recent
decades. However, generating interest in water banks among stakeholders accustomed to
specific water allocation arrangements largely defined by prior appropriation water law
can prove difficult without understanding the geographical context and organizational
structures of their current use patterns.
This dissertation uses social and policy science research methods to examine the
challenges of implementing new water reallocation schemes in Utah, with particular
emphasis on Cache Valley and the Bear River Basin. The research framed key interview
questions pertaining to the impacts of water banks within the water security paradigm to
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illustrate their utility at different scales and potential tradeoffs among water use sectors. It
also relied on secondary data analysis of policy-related literature regarding water
reallocation in the western United States, as well as participant observation of
deliberations over water banking legislation in Utah.
This research found that water banks have evolved over time as adaptive policies
through context specific institutional designs that balance competing approaches to water
reallocation and integrate market features with prior appropriation law. We further show
that in systems with highly interconnected uses like the Bear River Basin, the impacts of
water bank transfers on the water security of disparate interests and ecosystems are likely
to vary by scale. Finally, we illustrate how existing institutions have shaped water use
behaviors among northern Utah stakeholders, and how those institutions might intersect
with new reallocation schemes is a key issue in the expansion of water banks. This
dissertation contributes to the academic literature and public policy discussions on
market-based reallocation through a socially informed and contextually focused
examination of the obstacles to institutional reform via water banks. Such insights are
vital for policies that rely on the participation of key stakeholders to succeed.
(207 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
A Multi-Scalar Socio-Policy Analysis of Resource Reallocation and Water Security in
Twenty-first Century Utah, USA
Clint P. Carney
As drought and a warming climate continue to impact the western United States,
balancing the water needs of cities, agriculture, and natural systems is becoming
increasingly more complex. One approach commonly promoted to address water supply
issues is the transfer of water between users via markets. However, markets for water
face multiple obstacles that can often be costly for participants due to constraints inherent
in western U.S. water law. Coinciding with issues of cost, water markets must overcome
disinterest among water rights holders in releasing their water rights for uses even if
temporarily. Moreover, water transfers bring to light the potential impacts to security in
access to water for other needs when water is moved between locations and uses.
This research examined key challenges to the establishment and use of marketbased transfer arrangements known as water banks. Existing water banks in other states
were first analyzed to assess how they have added flexibility to existing water law in
order to address specific or broad impacts of water scarcity. Northern Utah’s Bear River
Basin then served as a case setting to examine the complexities of establishing water
banks through the perspectives of individual water users and others involved in water
management. Data were collected through interviews, focus groups, observations of
legislative workgroups, and analysis of existing literature.
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This research found that the benefits of transfers through water banks are potentially
dependent on the scale of interest that the transaction is assessed at and how the
consumption of water is managed. Moreover, this work found that the prevailing
behaviors and attitudes regarding water transfers are in part rooted in how existing water
laws and organizations have controlled allocation and use of the resource. Understanding
these social factors is critical to the policy designs of market-based approaches to sharing
water that rely on participation of water rights holders to contribute towards rebalancing
water supplies and meeting policy objectives at all scales of interest.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Overview
Societies worldwide are confronted by multiple water security threats in the 21st
Century. Instances of absolute water scarcity now frequently coincide with chronic water
management challenges in industrialized and developing nations alike. The western
United States (U.S.) is no exception to this trend despite immense 20th Century
investments in water infrastructure and institutions at the federal, state, and local levels.
Alterations in the hydrologic cycle and persistent drought, driven largely by climate
change, have impacted livelihoods and ecosystems in every western state for over two
decades (Borunda, 2021). Some of the most extreme manifestations of these changes
were witnessed in the summer of 2021 from the Pacific Northwest to the Colorado River
Basin (Cappucci and Samenow, 2021; Wilson and James, 2021). Coinciding with
prolonged drought and shifts in hydroclimatic conditions beyond their normal bounds of
variability (“non-stationary hydrology”), the southwestern states are experiencing
aridification, which is defined as the long-term warming and drying trend since the late
20th Century (Milly et al., 2008; Overpeck and Udall, 2020). This term characterizes the
observed trend in higher temperatures driving runoff declines in river systems such as the
Colorado River Basin, where even normal or above average snowpack in recent years
have yielded unexpectedly lower rates of spring runoff due to soil and plant uptake and
sublimation (Woodhouse et al., 2018; Milly and Dunne, 2020).
As the realities of water scarcity unfold in tandem with economic growth in the
western U.S., managers and stakeholders face scenarios requiring innovative policies and
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greater societal cooperation. Moreover, allaying the region’s water insecurities will require a
renewed commitment to technological and institutional investments to manage water
scarcity and variability. Historically, the transfer of water within and between agriculture,
municipal/industrial, and environmental uses has been practiced in response to the region’s
temporal and spatial variability in water supplies (Brewer et al., 2008). Yet, scholars have
suggested that reallocation, particularly through water markets, remains an underutilized
approach to mitigating water scarcity in the western U.S. (Culp et al., 2014). Water market
expansion has been promoted in recent decades as a lower cost alternative to water
development to meet current and projected needs (Iseman et al., 2012). Despite their
anticipated benefits, water markets face notable obstacles, including transaction costs,
conveyance constraints, competing interests, participatory reluctance, and perceptions of
social inequity resulting from further commodification of water (Marston and Cai, 2016;
Leonard et al., 2019).
In response to these institutional complexities, water banks have been
implemented in several western states to facilitate the coordination of market-based water
rights transfers. The institutional diversity of water banks reflects the various hydrologic
contexts and water insecurities across the western U.S. All water banks, however, must
function within the tenets of prior appropriation law, the fundamental legal doctrine that
has guided water allocation in the western states since the late 19th Century. In the state of
Utah, the 2020 legislature passed a water banking bill sanctioning the statewide
implementation of pilot water banks (Utah Legislature, 2020). The bill’s eligibility
requirements to establish water banks maintain that applicants hold valid water rights and
meet specific administrative criteria prior to approval by Utah’s Board of Water
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Resources. Framers of Utah’s legislation saw water banking as a policy tool to help stem
the trend of urbanization based on the “buy and dry” of agricultural land that has
depressed local agricultural economies in other western states in recent decades.
Moreover, they envisioned water banks providing access to water rights for the state’s
threatened aquatic habitats, including the Great Salt Lake. Despite these well-intended
objectives, expansion of water transfers under existing allocation law without examining
the potential social and hydro-physical tradeoffs of such policies could potentiate
outcomes that are inconsistent with the overarching objectives of Utah’s water banking
statute.
While a wealth of research has examined the economic facets of water
reallocation, focus on the social complexities (“human dimensions”) in market-based
water transfers in the U.S. West remains limited. As illustrated in the existing literature,
social and institutional design factors such as access, equity, transparency, and pricing
can each contribute to determining the long-term success of reallocation policies in
mitigating water insecurity (Tisdell and Ward, 2003; Giannoccaro et al., 2013; Bjornlund
et al., 2014). Such is the case in emerging water banking initiatives or where existing
entities have experienced limited activity or interest. As competition for increasingly
scarce and variable water supplies in the western U.S. grows, further insight into the
human dimensions of water reallocation will be essential to inform policy reform
measures that meet individual needs and collective priorities.
Dissertation Objectives
The overall goal of this dissertation is to provide a deeper understanding of how
water reallocation through water banking influences water security in the western U.S. at
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multiple scalar dimensions through the perspectives of people who will be relied on the
most to generate water bank activity. The policy design and eventual passage of Utah’s
water banking bill provides a unique sequence of events from which to assess the human
dimensions of water reallocation. The timing and location of these developments have
provided an opportunity to fulfill the following research objectives through a qualitative,
mixed methods approach:
1) to assess how water banks in the western U.S. have served as adaptive policy
responses to disparate water insecurities;
2) to examine the scalar-based tradeoffs in water security with the potential
establishment of water banks in a complex hydro-social setting; and
3) to illustrate through the perspectives of stakeholders with diverse connections
to water use and governance the social and institutional obstacles inherent to water
reallocation in a contextualized yet representative watershed setting of the western U.S.
The significance of this dissertation lies in its approach to understanding the
complexities of water reallocation in a time and location where traditional uses and
emerging needs vie for increasingly scarce and variable water supplies. A unique
attribute of market-based water reallocation schemes such as water banks is that
voluntary stakeholder participation is required for the policy to function and meet various
objectives. Hence, understanding behavioral and social dynamics of the water user
community is critical to informing water banking policy implementation. Unlike research
on water markets through an economics lens, this dissertation addressed the question of
water reallocation’s influence on water security through social and policy related
research. This approach relies on insights from northern Utah stakeholders to provide a
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contextualized understanding of the diverse connections and needs that water users have
with the resource and the institutions that govern water’s allocation. As water users in the
western U.S. continue to face fluctuating conditions in water supplies that trend toward
less overall availability, cultivating greater cooperation in managing and sharing existing
resources will be essential to mitigate absolute water scarcity. Hence, it is imperative to
understand the human dimensions of water reallocation, particularly with those
stakeholders who possess the most senior water rights and other interests who still seek
greater access to water. The findings of this dissertation are intended to contribute to both
the ongoing water security dialogue in the literature as well as to inform policy designs
and reform measures necessary for the establishment or enhancement of water banks in
the western U.S.
Dissertation Structure
This dissertation is presented in a multiple-paper format that includes an
introductory chapter, three research chapters, and a concluding chapter that summarizes
research findings. Chapters II, III, and IV have been prepared for publishing in specific
academic journals. The research chapters are co-authored with investigators from the
“Water Banking in Cache County” research project team. Chapter III has already been
published (Carney et al., 2021). The primary qualitative data used in this research was
acquired between July 2018 and April 2019 by members of the research team and
involved semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and participant observation of
legislative working group sessions. Secondary data acquisition occurred in various phases
from 2018 through 2021.
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The research chapters are sequenced from broader to more specific inquiries
related to this dissertation’s overall research theme of understanding the scalar-based
water security implications of reallocation through water banks. Chapter II examines the
role of water banks as policy responses to water insecurity in the western U.S. historically
and includes case analyses of four specific water banks developed in varying hydrologic
and water insecurity contexts. This assessment was intended to illustrate through a
framework of questions how water banks originated in the region and the specific water
insecurities they were intended as a response to. This qualitative research utilized diverse
sources of secondary data found in various types of literature and was verified with key
experts within the water bank entities investigated. This article focuses on the
transformative rules and administrative designs that allowed water banks to respond to
various water insecurity issues in ways that existing policies were incapable of or limited
in fulfilling. Moreover, this research illustrates how water banks have integrated market
principles with prior appropriation, how various water banks have or have not adapted to
emerging needs, and the progress of western U.S. water banks in attaining specific policy
objectives.
Chapter III examines the human dimensions of water reallocation and water
security through the northern Utah context. Specifically, this chapter relies on keyinformant interviews and focus groups with a diverse set of stakeholders to understand
the multi-scalar tradeoffs of water banking from the perspective of those most intimately
connected to the region’s water resources. To set up this assessment, the article first
examines the definition of water security through the views of stakeholders who either 1)
directly use local water resources for economic gain, 2) seek access to use the resource
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for non-consumptive purposes, or 3) manage the resource at specific levels of
governance. The article uses stakeholder insights to examine how water banking could
impact users’ water security at different hydro-physical scales as well as the water
security tradeoffs that could unfold at different watershed scales with inter- and intrasectoral water rights transfers through water banks.
Chapter IV also relies on the northern Utah context to examine the relationship
between existing water institutions and the behaviors and perspectives of individuals
regarding water use and reallocation and how this relationship can influence the
implementation of water banks. The chapter uses the northern Utah context to illustrate
the challenges of introducing new water reallocation policies in regions steeped in longestablished modes of allocation and water use. This article intends to demonstrate that in
addition to economic facets of reallocation (i.e., transaction costs), key human
dimensions (i.e., behaviors, perceptions, fears, needs) must be considered in developing
new institutional designs for water transfers. The sources of these human dimensions are
further explored through the path dependency lens to illustrate how existing institutions
as well as individual choices have contributed to molding the perspectives and behaviors
that could influence water users’ interest in and capacity to participate in water banking.
While focused on an area in the western U.S., findings from this chapter provide
generalizable concepts for other regions seeking to establish or catalyze activity in
existing water banks or other reallocation schemes that involve decisions at the individual
level needed to satisfy broader, collective-defined policy objectives.
The conclusions of this dissertation are summarized in Chapter 5. Note that since
chapters II, III, and IV represent individual research articles, each one contains separate
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background and methodological sections (including relevant literature) germane to the
theme of each individual article.
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CHAPTER II
WATER BANKING AS AN ADAPTIVE RESPONSE TO WATER INSECURITY IN
THE WESTERN UNITED STATES1
Abstract
Water banks have served as institutional policy responses to water insecurity in
the western United States for over four decades. We examined through content analysis
how institutional reform has allowed water banks to fulfill collectively defined objectives
in diverse hydrologic contexts. Findings revealed that water banks have over time
attained sustained levels of activity independent of their institutional origins. Adaptive
features of water banks were the result of key rule modifications that integrated
historically rigid allocation law with market features. Moreover, mature water banks have
required considerable timespans and ongoing institutional investments before they
contribute towards meeting specific policy objectives.
Introduction
The establishment of water banks has served as a policy response to various water
insecurities in the western United States for over four decades. Competition for water and
the hydrologic realities of climate change have further necessitated reallocation
arrangements within and between uses in the region’s over-allocated watersheds
(Anderson and Woosley, 2005; Culp et al., 2014; Overpeck and Udall, 2020; Wheeler et
al., 2021). “Water bank” is a generic term used to describe various institutional
arrangements that repurpose water rights for needs different than their original approved
1

Co-Authors: Joanna Endter-Wada and Lisa Welsh. Formatted to the specifications of the Journal
of the American Water Resources Association.
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use (whereas water banking refers to participating in a water bank transaction or the
physical act of storing water). Common water bank designs in the western United States
(U.S. West) integrate administrative and economic incentives to encourage temporary
transfers of surface water, groundwater, or storage water between users (MacDonnell et
al., 1994; Ghosh et al., 2014).
Water banks have been promoted as institutional circumventions to the economic
and administrative obstacles encountered in private water market transactions
(MacDonnell, 1994; Clifford et al., 2004; Podolak and Doyle, 2014). Short-term and
permanent water transfers in the U.S. West through formal and informal water markets
have increased in number over recent decades (Brewer et al., 2007; Iseman et al., 2012).
Despite the existence of mature water markets in some states (Carey and Sunding, 2001;
Howe and Goemans, 2003; Hanak et al., 2019), multiple impediments to their expansion
have been described in the literature. Transaction costs are often suggested as the primary
barrier to transfer activity (Frederick, 2001; Garrick et al., 2013; Hanemann and Young,
2020), yet, other hindrances include equity issues, third party effects, stakeholder
perceptions, and legal constraints on inter-state transactions (Chong and Sunding, 2006;
Easter and Huang, 2014; Leonard et al., 2019). Moreover, pursuit of land and water right
purchases by outside interests in water scarce areas has drawn increased scrutiny of
market influences on water allocation in recent years, including in the upper Colorado
River Basin (Kuta, 2020; Howe, 2021).
Negotiated water right transfers between parties are pursued in the U.S. West to
satisfy disparate public and private needs alike (Garrick et al., 2009; Iseman et al., 2012;
Aylward et al., 2020). Water banks, however, are publicly sanctioned entities that
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coordinate market-based transfers to meet collectively defined policy objectives
(MacDonnell et al., 1994; Brennan, 2017). By design, water banks provide centralized
institutional structure to the use of water transfers in mitigating the repercussions of water
scarcity. Hence, a key institutional feature of water banks is their capacity to adaptively
respond to diverse water insecurities while functioning within existing modes of water
governance.
Since MacDonnell et al.’s (1994) comprehensive analysis of water banks, a
limited number of peer-reviewed articles (Megdal et al., 2014, Montilla-Lopez et al.,
2016) and other professional reports (Clifford et al., 2004; O’Donnell and Colby, 2010;
Cronin and Fowler, 2012; Haller, 2018; Eberling et al., 2019) have assessed the state of
the practice in the U.S. West. However, the literature is abridged regarding the adaptative
implementations of water banks in response to the region’s chronic and emerging water
insecurities. We present research on the institutional reforms that have occurred via the
establishment of water banks in the U.S. West. We conduct a systematic review (Grant
and Booth, 2009) of how policy designs and subsequent modifications have influenced
the adaptation of water banks to mitigating the consequences of water scarcity. We relied
on content analysis of secondary data sources to assess how water banks have functioned
within existing legal frameworks while instilling greater flexibility and policy intent into
the water transfer process. We first evaluate water bank development over time in the
U.S. West in light of the water insecurities that catalyzed their establishment. Second, we
examine the institutional changes established through water banks and how such reforms
have contributed towards meeting collectively defined policy objectives in ways that
existing tools of governance were unable to effectively resolve. We met this objective by
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examining case examples of water banks that were established in response to various
water insecurities through a framework of questions intended to illustrate: 1) the
exogenous drivers that prompted the implementation of water banks; 2) the interests
promoting institutional change; 3) the resulting institutional entities and their position
within existing water governance arrangements; 4) the newly defined water bank
capacities; 5) how existing water allocation laws were integrated with market principles;
6) examples of adaptations made in the use or administration of water banks; and 7) the
resulting level of water bank activity.
We provide a nuanced examination of institutional design features that bolster the
capacity for water banks to mitigate water insecurity in the U.S. West. The article
highlights why specific rules were needed in response to different water insecurities, how
they were implemented, and the resulting institutional capacities afforded to water banks
through new or modified rules. Moreover, we provide an assessment of the state of water
banking in the U.S. West since the benchmark works by MacDonnell et al. (1994) and
Clifford et al. (2004). We illustrate factors of institutional change that can inform future
pursuits of water banking policies or for existing water banks seeking to enhance their
capacity to coordinate water transfers to mitigate increasingly urgent and collectively
recognized water insecurities.
Water Banks as a Response to Water Insecurity
Garrick and Hall (2014, p. 617) describe water insecurity as a state in which
“conditions of the aquatic environment threaten the welfare and freedoms of individuals,
communities, and societies.” Water insecurity emerges from acute events (droughts,
floods), chronic conditions (scarcity, impaired water quality), or policy deficiencies (i.e.,

15
inequitable allocation schemes). While natural events are uncontrollable, anticipation of
and response to their outcomes is a function of public policy. To this point, Pahl-Wostl et
al. (2013) argue that water insecurity can result from, and yet also be abated through
governance processes, and that indicators of tradeoffs are critical in guiding policies
aimed at reducing water insecurity. Here, we frame water banks in the context of the U.S.
West’s enduring and emerging water insecurities related to aridity and drought, and
supplement Garrick et al.’s definition to include the welfare of aquatic ecosystems. This
perspective contributes to illustrating the adaptive traits of water banks and how they
have responded to diverse and interdependent water management challenges.
Origins and Drivers
Formalized water banks in the U.S. West originated in the late 1970s. California
implemented a temporary water bank as part of drought response policy, and long-term
state water planning in Idaho included establishment of a statewide water bank program
(Idaho Water Resources Board, 1976; California Dept. of Water Resources, 1978). Since
then, water banks of varied scale and scope have been crafted in nearly every state west
of the 100th Meridian (Ebeling et al., 2019). Overall scarcity has been the prevailing
driver for water transfers in the U.S. West historically (MacDonnell, 2015), and its
impacts in over-appropriated watersheds have further manifested across economic sectors
and aquatic ecosystems (Culp et al., 2014; Richter et al., 2020; Tempus, 2020). Table 2.1
lists various socio-economic, hydrologic, and policy-based drivers that have spurred
water reallocation in the U.S. West in recent decades. In addition to administrative
approaches to reallocation such as general stream adjudications, markets for water have
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Table 2.1 Larger contextual factors in the U.S. West that have necessitated
implementation of water banks or other policy arrangements to transfer water
within or between economic sectors.
Hydro-Physical

Socio-Economic

Policy

- Increasing interannual and
seasonal runoff variability

- Changing in regional
economies and new
industries

- State or federal
environmental policy
enactments (e.g.,
Endangered Species Act)

- Drought and aridification
- Land use modifications
- Changes in cropping
patterns
- Over-reliance on

groundwater sources and
land subsidence

- Agricultural economy shifts
in response to commodity
values and market
internationalization
- Changing societal
perspectives regarding
beneficial use of water
- Population growth

- Use in interstate or tribal
compact arrangements
- Declaration of fully or over
appropriated watersheds
- Different legal regimes for

groundwater and surface
water that disregard their
connectivity

emerged as a preferred approach for meeting new demands in settings where institutional
commitment and suitable infrastructure exist, such as in northern Colorado and
California’s Central Valley (Howe and Goemans, 2003; Hanak, 2015). To overcome the
aforementioned water market obstacles, water banks have integrated market functions
with regulatory siderails and administrative support to elicit stakeholder interest in
temporary water right transfers to collectively meet defined objectives (Castle and
MacDonnell, 2016; Haller, 2018).
Water Bank Arrangements
Administration of water banks in the U.S. West ranges from entirely stateoperated programs to privately operated entities (Haller, 2018). They are not novel
creations, however. Water banks conceptually model long practiced water share trading
within the region’s myriad canal companies and irrigation districts (MacDonnell et al.,
1994). Clifford et al. (2004) identified 23 active water banks in the early 2000s, although
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some are part of the same governing structure within the Idaho water bank system and
others were in the initial phases of development but never became functional (H. RiselyWhite, personal communication, December 8, 2020). Brennan (2017) listed 94 separate
entities in the U.S. West that “self-recognized as water banks.” However, some entities in
this list were temporary or never became operational. Over two dozen local water banks
have been established in Washington since 2003, and Utah passed a bill in 2020 allowing
pilot water banks statewide (Haller, 2018; Utah Legislature, 2020).
Water banks have been classified in the literature by the type of water source
managed, administrative format, intended purpose, or market structure (Miller, 2000;
Clifford et al., 2004; Montilla-López et al., 2016). Aside from interstate agreements, most
water banks in the U.S. West operate with market-based transactions. Depositing water
for lease into water banks is usually limited to the consumptive portion of a water right
given the highly interdependent nature of water delivery systems and other users’
dependence on return flows. Transactional arrangements vary by bank, but common
approaches to stimulate participation include 1) bilateral exchanges between participants;
2) pooling of deposited water rights to lease as credit towards a mitigation need; or 3)
direct payments from managing entities to encourage water conservation practices that
make water available for other uses (Clifford et al., 2004). Montilla-López et al. (2016)
recognized active and passive banks, with the former typology serving as a “market
maker” by actively acquiring and leasing or selling water rights to interested parties. The
latter refers to banks that act as clearinghouses to match interested actors and promote
price discovery (if water bank rules permit negotiations). Passive banks however do not
typically own or seek acquisition of water rights. Here, we define all water banks that use
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market incentives to transact water rights between parties for compensation, whether
bilaterally or between individuals or through pooled blocks of water as intermediaries.
Those institutions without a market-based focus, such as interstate banking arrangements,
are considered non-market water banks. Intermediary banks are of particular interest in
this research because they represent a policy reform measure that attempts to integrate
structured administrative controls (prior appropriation) with market-based transactions.
This combination creates unique opportunities and challenges in meeting public policy
objectives.
Water conservation practices in the agricultural sector (i.e., lease-fallow
agreements, split-season arrangements) that make available fractional volumes of a water
right are common in the U.S. West (Colby, 2017; Richter et al., 2017). Such practices can
be stand-alone policies or included within a water bank’s operational design. As Castle
and MacDonnell (2016) note however, these arrangements can lack the expediency
necessary to meet seasonal needs and are often bilateral in nature. As centralized
facilitators, water banks can integrate conservation practices and sharing arrangements
between multiple interests in ways that enhance temporary water transfer activity in overallocated watersheds.
Understanding Water Banks as Institutions
Institutional reform through water banking is situated at the intersection of
governance, markets, and the provision of social goods. Ostrom (2007, p. 23) defines
institutions as “shared concepts used by humans in repetitive situations organized by
rules, norms, and strategies” within markets, business, government, and other social
interactions. North (1990, p. 6) suggested that institutions reduce uncertainty in society
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by “establishing a stable structure to human interactions.” Institutions can be formal
(i.e., laws, regulations, court decisions) or informal (customs, ideology) (Schmid, 2004).
Institutions are also commonly discerned as the visible structures of government such as
legislatures, judiciaries, and agencies that enact and execute laws and rulemaking (Kraft
and Furlong, 2016). In this article, we rely on Ostrom’s (2007) definition of institutions
as described in this section. Note however, descriptions in this article of institutional
reform via rule changes directly involves how the governing entities function. Water
governance in the U.S. West involves various formal and informal institutional
arrangements that have guided the apportionment, distribution, and reallocation of water
since the 19th Century.
The prior appropriation doctrine (prior appropriation) is one of the most
consequential institutions implemented since European settlement in the region. It created
security for early claimants of surface flows by granting seniority in access to use their
water right’s full apportionment prior to those who established uses from the same
watercourse later in time (Getches et al., 2009). In times of shortage, users who are
“junior” in time to senior water right holders face greater insecurity in their annual
allocations. Senior water rights were typically claimed by irrigators, mining operations,
and municipalities. Over time, increasingly complex water allocation arrangements
emerged between the federal government and irrigation entities (MacDonnell, 2015). At
the individual level, prior appropriation bounds users to continuous exercise of a water
right, and water right transfers are permitted only if the change in use does not impair
other users accessing the same watercourse. Hence, prior appropriation provides security
to senior water right holders yet constrains water access for emerging societal priorities in
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overallocated watersheds. New users must therefore obtain water rights from existing
uses through costly water transfer procedures.
Grafton et al. (2011) recognizes adaptive institutions as those that are “able to
adjust to unexpected shocks, incorporate new and revised information, and respond in a
timely manner to changes in societal preferences over how water is managed and used.”
As adaptive institutions in the U.S. West, water banks interlace the tenets of prior
appropriation with market concepts to cultivate more flexible water transfers intended to
serve collective needs. Yet, institutional designs that balance these foundational concepts
illustrates what Garrick (2015, p. 114) describes as “the dynamic tension between
stability and flexibility” in water reallocation reform. North (2006) defines adaptive
efficiency as “an ongoing condition in which the society continues to modify or create
new institutions as problems evolve.” Adaptive efficiency differs from neoclassical
economic efficiency (“least-cost” pathways) in that it emphasizes outcomes of
institutional modifications over time in meeting emerging political challenges (Garrick,
2015). While transaction cost reduction has been the focus of research on water market
reform (Slaughter, 2009; McCann and Garrick, 2014), water bank transactions may
involve social objectives that transcend exclusive focus on minimizing economic
constraints for individuals (Livingston, 2005). Hence, water banks can lessen private
transaction costs for individual participants and the outcomes of water transfers can lead
to socially desired goals depending on how this underlying tension is managed. But that
may not result in the “highest and best use” in strictly neoclassical economic terms
precisely because it is attempting to find a more politically optimal solution across social
scales.
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Livingston (2005) articulates the utility of examining institutional change in water
governance through a political economy perspective that extends beyond the notion of
economic efficiency. She notes that institutions attain equilibrium when little to no
pressure exists from internal or external sources of change but fall into disequilibrium
when “the political clout of potential winners exceeds the political clout of potential
losers” (p. 24). In the U.S. West for example, prior appropriation brought security for
water users throughout much of the 20th Century until coinciding societal priorities and
increasingly threatened supplies revealed the doctrine’s limitations and necessitated
alternative approaches to reallocation (MacDonnell, 2015). To assess the question of
“why and how institutions change,” Livingston (2005, p. 22) stresses the importance of
the social and political drivers that exist at the micro and meso levels of institutional
transformations. The micro level refers to underlying societal pressures based on human
values that can shape interest group action and spur institutional change (i.e., social
welfare, equity). The meso level relates to the processes, facilitators, and inhibitors of
institutional change, including rule structures, physical (objective) elements, social
(subjective) perceptions, path dependency, and transaction costs. At this level, water
reallocation reform is driven in part by rule changes within the existing allocation
institutions. In the establishment of water banks, rules have involved incentivizing
behavioral change in ways that ideally benefit both transacting parties while also
contributing to collective goals. A key aspect in assessing institutional reform is
determining the “nested” level of governance that change occurs within. The nested
concept refers to the hierarchical interrelations of institutions and their inherent rule
structures (North, 1990; Ostrom 2007). Regarding water allocation, Livingston (2005)
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notes that rules exist within three nested layers – water laws, water policies, and water
administration. These layers are analogous with Ostrom’s (1990) tiered structure of
institutional rules at constitutional-choice, collective-choice, and operational-choice
levels that she uses to characterize how the rulemaking process is rationed between
legislative bodies, regulating agencies, and operational entities, respectively. In some
states, legislatively established water laws provide the legal foundations that define how
water banks are established, by whom, where, and for what purposes. How these laws are
carried out is defined at the policymaking level, and how policy execution is managed
can be defined at the operational level. Understanding rule changes and the levels of
governance they occur at (meso level) in connection with social or political drivers
(micro level) provides a framing of how water banks have emerged and evolved from
existing institutional structures in the U.S. West.
This research relies on Livingston’s (2005) micro and meso level concepts of
institutional change to examine the adaptive characteristics of select intermediary water
banks in the U.S. West. We utilize a framework of questions (Table 2.2) to evaluate
institutional change drivers at the micro level and what rule changes at the meso level
have allowed water banks to adaptively respond to various water insecurities. We further
examine how water banks integrate the antithetical objectives of the market (expansion of
use) with those of prior appropriation (protection of existing uses). Data used in support
of the findings presented in the following section was acquired from content analysis of
scholarly journals, state and local agency publications, state statutes, online data, and
media sources that focused on identifying specific features of institutional arrangements,
rules, and objectives. Research findings were verified through written or oral
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Table 2.2 Framework of questions for evaluating micro- and meso-level factors
in institutional change via the establishment of water banks in the U.S. West.

Meso Level

Micro Level

Guiding Questions in
Assessing the
Adaptive Designs of
Water Banks

Objective & Relevance

1. Water Insecurity
Drivers

To identify and assess the diversity in water insecurities that
have catalyzed adaptive water reallocation through water
banks in the U.S. West.

2. Nature of Founding
Entities

To illustrate the diversity in institutional origins of water
banks (i.e., state legislation, grassroots efforts) and the actors
advancing change through water bank implementation (i.e.,
members of legislative or regulatory efforts, local water
districts).

3. Structure of
Implementation

To illustrate the modifications of existing institutional
arrangements, the levels of governance in which they occur
at, and how nesting and linkages of water banks with other
existing entities and existing laws were designed.

4. Resulting Capacities
of Water Bank

To identify the institutional capacities authorized for water
banks in mitigating specific water insecurities that modify or
exceed existing policy options.

5. Integration of Prior
Appropriation
and Market
Principles

To understand how water banks have modified prior
appropriation to incorporate within market-based incentives
and transactions.

6. Ongoing
Adaptations

To assess how water banks have continued to adapt to
emerging water insecurities or function with greater
administrative efficiency over time.

7. Progress in Attaining
Policy Objectives

To assess the trends in water bank activity over time and how
water bank entities have performed in meeting policy
objectives.
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communication with key individuals associated with the specific water bank entities
discussed in this article.
Findings
This section first assesses the trajectory of water banks in the U.S. West framed in
the context of the water insecurities that catalyzed their establishment. Then, we utilize
the framework of questions in Table 2.2 to examine pathways and outcomes of
institutional reform in four case examples of water banks in the U.S. West.
The Evolving Adaptations of Water Banks
Although similar stresses have led to water insecurity in the western states (Table
2.1), diverse water bank designs emerged to meet localized needs corresponding to
unique hydro-physical, social-economic, and policy contexts. Table 2.3 characterizes five
water insecurities that intermediary and non-market water banks have responded to in the
U.S. West: 1) scarcity-driven asymmetries in water access, 2) environmental needs, 3)
mitigation of competing uses, 4) aquifer overdraft, and 5) interstate river basin
governance. “Environmental needs” refers to the application of water transfers to meet
ecosystem service needs such as endangered species habitat protection or water quality
improvement. While the term “ecosystem services” has taken on various meanings
(Wallace, 2007; Boyd and Banzhaf, 2009), this research refers to the framing of
ecosystem services as the “delivery mechanisms” between natural systems and the
benefits they provide society (Danley and Widmark, 2016). Some water banks in the U.S.
West have multi-scalar designs to address water insecurities involving different water
types, sources, and sectors of water use, whereas others focus on single water sources
within isolated watersheds or more confined areas. The timeline in Figure 2.1 exhibits the
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sequential emergence of water banks across the region in response to the water insecurity
drivers listed in Table 2.3 (and identified in the brown horizontal bar) and provides
notational coding as to whether they were locally established (L), a response to federal
initiatives (F), formed under state legislation (S), or were organized at the state or local
level but not in response to water banking legislation. Snapshots of climate conditions
accompany the timeline to highlight drought patterns in the U.S. West at key points in
time in the emergence of water banks.
We highlight two general phases in water bank development (Figure 2.1). First
was a relatively slow period from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s in which the
establishment of statewide, regional, or interstate scale programs focused on mitigating
generally acute (California) or anticipated long-term scarcity (Idaho, Texas). Beginning
in the early 2000s, more issue-specific or local scale banks emerged in connection with
greater attention to the side effects of punctuated drought that gripped most of the U.S.
West in the early 2000s (Figure 2.1). These new specialized water banks focused on
conjunctive management, ecosystem service needs, and aquifer management in response
to drivers such as endangered species protection or moratoriums on new uses.
Groundwater has been a key water insecurity issue in the U.S. West, with several water
bank initiatives involving conjunctive use between connected aquifer-surface water
systems, aquifer storage and recovery, or interstate water management.

Table 2.3 Major water insecurity themes that prompted the establishment of water banks in the U.S. West. Example entities and
implementation drivers for those examples are provided in the second and third columns. Codes next to each water insecurity in
the first column are shown on the Figure 2.1 timeline.
Water Insecurity
Scarcity-based Asymmetries
in Access to Water (SCA)
(Driven by drought or chronic
pressures from existing and
emerging demands in fully- or
over-appropriated watersheds)

Example Entities
§ ID State Water Supply Bank & Rental Pools
§ CA Drought Mitigation Water Banks
(1970s and 1990s)
§ Klamath Basin Water Bank program (OR, CA)

Implementation Drivers
Anticipated scarcity in certain sectors due to overappropriated watersheds.
Ongoing drought conditions spurring shortages for
California’s municipal sector.
Competing human and ecosystem needs exacerbated by
drought.

Aquifer Overdraft (AO)
(Declining groundwater levels
from extractive rates beyond the
safe yield of an aquifer)

Mitigation of Competing Uses
(CU)
(Interference of surface water
flows by groundwater pumping in
closed/fully appropriated
watersheds)

§ Central KS Water Bank Association

Over reliance on groundwater in hydraulic connection
with surface water.

§ Semitropic Water Bank (CA)

Long-term groundwater use exceeding recharge.

§ ID State Water Supply Bank & Rental Pools

Lower priority groundwater users impairing senior
surface water rights.

§ Washington Water Banking and State Trust
Water Rights Programs

Population growth, changing economies, public values in
natural amenities.

§ Grass Valley French Ditch Co. Water Bank (MT)

Residential developments replacing agricultural lands.
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Water Insecurity

Example Entities

Implementation Drivers

Environmental Needs (EN)
(Ecosystem services (i.e. endangered species habitat
maintenance), water quality
enhancements)

§ Central Platte Natural Resources District
Water Bank (NE)

Endangered species needs in an over-appropriated
watershed.

§ NRCS Water Bank (MN, SD, ND)

Land use enhancements to improve critical avian habitat
areas.

§ Ongoing pilot projects organized by a consortium
of river basin organizations in western CO

Potential Colorado River Compact obligations, ongoing
drought, aridification.

§ AZ Water Banking Authority

Goal of full utilization of allocated Colorado River
Compact water.

§ Lower Colorado River basin state agreements

Coordinated interstate storage of compact water.

Interstate River Basin
Governance (IG)
(Arrangements between states,
tribes, and the federal government
to store unused river compact
apportionments, mitigate
shortages, maintain reservoir
operations)
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Figure 2.1 Timeline of water bank establishment in the U.S. West. Water insecurity catalysts, mode of implementation, and
corresponding windows of drought severity are also shown. Note: state silhouettes do not represent exact relative areas to one another
(Palmer Drought Severity Index data source: National Centers for Environmental Information (https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/)).
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The implementation drivers (Table 2.3) demonstrate the dynamic nature of
allocation issues that have magnified the U.S. West’s water insecurity. The applicability
of water banks to address challenges stemming from water scarcity, emerging laws,
competing uses, or complex governance arrangements reveal their versatility as a policy
instrument. The promotion of water banks as a type of market-based reallocation strategy
tells only a part of the narrative of their utility, however. As Table 2.3 exhibits, water
banks have served a role in enhancing market-based water transfers that are intended to
provide social goods deemed critical by the public. The following subsections illustrate
features of institutional change in four case water bank examples in the U.S. West in
reference to the specific water insecurities described in Table 2.3. These water banks
were chosen to present the diversity in institutional attributes of water banks as well as
the unique hydrologic and social contexts in which they originated. This article does not
assess interstate compact-related water banks, as their non-market designs are applied to
agreements between state or regional entities and not individuals.
Security-based Asymmetries in Access to Water – Idaho State Water Bank
The prevalence of insufficient surface runoff in the U.S. West to meet
contemporary water demands has brought forth opportunity for innovative reforms in
water reallocation policy. Aside from periodic yet controversial administrative or judicial
decisions to reapportion water (Blumm and Schwartz, 1995; Koehler, 1995; Benson,
2004), reallocation in the U.S. West has focused extensively on market arrangements to
repurpose water among private and public interests alike (Iseman et al., 2012). In the
state of Idaho (Figure 2.2), regulated market-based reallocation has been practiced for
over four decades following the 1979 passage of legislation that established the Idaho
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Water Supply Bank. Aspects of the bill were based on recommendations in the 1976
State Water Plan. Policymakers anticipated that eventual full utilization of the state’s
water would necessitate new approaches to balancing available water supplies (Idaho
Water Resources Board, 1976; IDWR, 2021a). Over time, this state-level policy initiative
has afforded adaptive reallocation options to meeting user needs at multiple scales.
Moreover, transaction costs for participants are relatively low in comparison with the

Figure 2.2 The state of Idaho with local rental pool service areas outlined in red,
including the Fort Hall Reservation. Note that the entire state is served by the
Board’s Water Supply Bank. (Map courtesy of A. Welsh)

expenses typically encountered in privately arranged water transfers. Costs for
participants typically involve only the water supply bank’s administrative fees and the
rental price for access to banked water rights. This water bank is managed by the Idaho
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Water Resources Board (Board) through two institutional mechanisms: the Board’s
Water Supply Bank (BWSB) and locally operated rental pools (LRPs). The BWSB is
operated on the Board’s behalf by the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) and
considers all types of water rights. Six LRPs, including one under the jurisdiction of the
Shoshone-Bannock Tribe, are administered by local water district boards. The local
boards define operational rules and oversee management of storage water leased to
common “pools” that is available for seasonal rentals (subject to Board approval). The
locally defined rules determine levels of access for those seeking rental water as well as
the annual (fixed) prices for water.
The nesting of water bank rules between the water bank statutes, the IDWR, and
local entities enhances administrative flexibility and responsiveness to stakeholder needs
(Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IDAPA), 37.02.03; R. Buyer, personal
communication, May 3, 2021). Water bank rules have contributed to streamlining the
water transfer process through centralized administrative that also accounts for local
conditions. Water rights for all beneficial uses are considered available for lease to the
BWSB, and all beneficial use categories are eligible for renting leased water rights from
the BWSB. While most transfers are within agriculture, the BWSB has arranged water
transfers between a diverse assortment of beneficial uses. Preliminary IDWR data of
approved rentals from 2013 through 2020 shows that out of 473 transactions, 139 (29%)
were non-irrigation to irrigation transfers and involved multiple unique combinations of
deposited water rights to fulfill rental requests (IDWR, 2021b). And, in comparison to
Idaho’s traditional change-in-use transfer process, the BWSB also enhances the
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flexibility in water right applications by providing users the option to rent their own water
rights for experimental uses that differ from the original water right.
Integral to the flexibility in water reallocation offered through the BWSB was the
forging of a policy space where market-based lease transactions are facilitated in part by
adjustments to prior appropriation law. Components of the water banking statutes and
subsequent rules established by the Board still conform to the review process used in
traditional water rights transfers, including the status and nature of water rights
considered for lease, the risk of enlargement, and the potential for injury to other water
rights. However, the BWSB rules declare deposited water rights exempt from forfeiture
while they are leased to the BWSB, negating prior appropriation’s requirement for
perpetual beneficial use. This rule provides dual benefits for lessors through forfeiture
protection as well as the opportunity for financial gain. In matching leases to rental
requests, BWSB rules further alter prior appropriation’s basic premise of seniority. In
matching banked water rights to rental requests, the BWSB uses an alternative hierarchy
that grants first consideration of rental requests with water rights that were leased to the
BWSB earliest in time (IDAPA, 37.02.03). If the eligible water rights leased earliest in
time to the bank do not entirely fulfill a rental request, the BWSB can structure a rental
with water rights leased later in time to fulfill the requested rental volume (R. Buyer,
personal communication, May 3, 2021). This rule benefits water bank administrators and
participants alike, as more robust activity is likely if interested lessors know that the
priority date of their water right will not limit its chances of being rented. Of Idaho’s six
operating LRPs, locally defined rules that dictate priority in rentals generally favor
agricultural use within the host water district ahead of other needs (IDWR 2020a, 2020b).
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Moreover, Idaho’s largest rental pool in Water District 01 charges higher rental fees for
uses downstream of its jurisdiction, which most often involve environmental flows and
hydropower production (IDWR, 2020a).
Use of LRPs for ecosystem service needs demonstrates the adaptability of water
banking for emerging water insecurities. In 1992, Idaho and the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation agreed to augment Snake River flows with rental pool water, providing
nearly a half million acre-feet annually for anadromous salmon migration during critical
flow periods. This agreement helped circumvent potential conflict over federal use of
state-owned water for threatened species in the Columbia River Basin (Fereday et al.,
2018). In 2001, the Lemhi River rental pool was established to acquire natural flow rights
to maintain minimum stream flows during peak irrigation season (Clifford et al., 2004).
More recently, LRPs have been used to mitigate disputes between surface water irrigators
with senior rights and groundwater users with junior priority to pump from the East
Snake River Plain Aquifer. There, junior right holders have recharged the aquifer with
rented water to mitigate pumping impacts on surface water rights (Matthews, 2015).
Idaho’s Water Supply Bank is arguably the most robust water bank system in the
U.S. West. BWSB activity has increased since the early 2000s along with new
applications of rentals from the LRPs. BWSB rentals have increased from 1,400 acrefeet/year in the late 1990s to 75,000 acre-feet/year from 2010-2017. Cumulative annual
LRP rentals comprise approximately four to five percent of the total annual volume of
surface water diverted for agriculture in Idaho (Dieter et al., 2018; Idaho Water
Resources Board, 2019). Hence, the Water Supply Bank’s sustained level of activity and
adaptability to meet emerging needs has demonstrated that foresight in institutional
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reforms can lead to eventual reliance on a versatile and well-accepted water reallocation
tool.
Aquifer Overdraft – Central Kansas Water Bank
In recent decades, overuse of fossil aquifers and increasing reliance on
groundwater due to greater variability in surface runoff have elevated long-term water
insecurity in the U.S. West’s agricultural sector (Scanlon et al., 2012; Wick, 2021). In
response, post hoc management of unsustainable aquifer use has been the focus of state
and local policy initiatives regionwide (Megdal, 2012; Young, 2016; Blomquist, 2020).
In this section, we examine a central Kansas water bank designed to sustain groundwater
resources in a subsection of the High Plains Aquifer (Figure 2.3). In the late 1990s,
studies initiated by the Kansas legislature explored options to remedy declining
groundwater levels in the High Plains Aquifer that were also impacting hydraulically
connected streams (Kansas Water Authority, 2000). The legislature in 2001 approved the
establishment of pilot water banks as “not-for-profit corporations” through the Kansas
Water Banking Act (Act) (Kansas Legislature, 2001). The law set forth foundational
objectives but designated rulemaking duties at both the state and local levels. The Act’s
approach to aquifer stabilization combined public resource conservation objectives with
an economic incentives-based program. The law requires a minimum of ten percent of
any transfer volume to remain in the aquifer, as well as the use of “safe deposits” that
allow irrigators to carry forward a portion of unused appropriated water for future use
(less a ten percent annual reduction from the account balance dedicated to the aquifer).
Furthermore, the Act expanded the allowable distance of water right transfers from 0.8
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Figure 2.3 The state of Kansas and the location of the Central Kansas Water
Bank Association’s service area (purple shading). (Map courtesy of A. Welsh)
km beyond the original point of use to anywhere within a water bank’s service area. To
promote greater equity between various uses, leases of water from the bank cannot be
denied in the application process based on its proposed use (Kansas Legislature, 2001; O.
Feril, personal communication, December 18, 2020).
The Central Kansas Water Bank Association (CKWBA) has been the sole water
bank established in the state. Created in 2005, the CKWBA covers 10,000 km2 within
Big Bend Groundwater Management District No. 5 (GMD-5). The groundwater-only
bank was pursued through a coalescence of localized initiatives that sought to minimize
impacts of aquifer withdrawals on surface drainages as well as to provide access for new
water uses. Groundwater use had been capped following a 1998 “safe yield closure” on
new appropriations of water in GMD-5. Rules within the Act and at the operational level
within the CKWBA have facilitated the integration of market features with prior
appropriation law in several ways to stimulate user participation.
First, the Act protects water rights holders by recognizing water bank deposits as
beneficial uses, which negates the risk of a non-use (abandonment) ruling by the state.
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Second, the CKWBA uses a sealed-bid auction process to match publicly advertised
water right deposits to potential lessees. The CKWBA does not apply pricing constraints,
as leases are awarded to the highest bidder. This transaction approach disregards the
priority status of deposited water rights in the auction process. The bank also
accommodates privately negotiated transactions (separate from the public auction).
Leased water is utilized through “term-permits” issued by
the state and are junior to existing wells during the time of lease. The leased right can be
exercised if the state has determined that no impairment will occur at nearby wells and
that pumping at new lease locations occurs from the same aquifer unit as the source water
right. CKWBA’s administrative rules have also facilitated more amenable transfer
options for users, such as partitioning deposits to satisfy smaller bid requests or pooling
multiple deposits to meet larger needs (O. Feril, personal communication, December 18,
2020).
Ongoing institutional adaptation of the CKWBA is facilitated through the Act’s
requirement for five-year external reviews. The CKWBA’s first review resulted in
adjustments to rules that had been identified to hinder bank activity. Moreover, lessons
from the CKWBA’s operations have informed statutory changes, including amendments
to the Act in 2012 that simplified the conserved water accounting process for users.
Activity within the CKWBA has steadily increased since its inception. By 2011, the bank
had accepted deposits totaling 600 acre-feet and approved ten safe deposit accounts, but
administered only one lease transfer (CKWBA, 2011). After its extension approval, the
CKWBA has averaged three leases annually and has approved 1,665 safe deposit
accounts (O. Feril, personal communication, September 17, 2021). While transfer activity
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has remained steady over the last decade, interest in the safe deposits demonstrates that
water rights holders see personal benefits in their operations with saving portions of their
annual apportionment for future use. Moreover, the hybrid governance approach has
established an institutional structure to potentially serve greater numbers of transfer in the
future as climatic, regulatory, or commodity market conditions may necessitate.
Mitigation of Competing Uses – Washington Water Banking and Trust Water Rights
Across the U.S. West, excessive groundwater extraction from aquifers in hydraulic
connection with surface water has elevated the water insecurity for needs reliant on both
sources (Wen and Chen, 2006; Cech, 2010; Brozović and Young, 2014). Policies to
conjunctively manage these resources vary by state and depend in part on whether
existing law recognizes their interconnection (Getches et al., 2009). The state of
Washington (Figure 2.4) has acknowledged this connection since 1945 and protection of
instream flows was prioritized in the state’s 1971 Water Resources Act (Washington
State Legislature, 2007). In 2003, ongoing drought prompted the legislative establishment
of water banking to enhance the water transfer process for diversionary and instream flow
needs in the Yakima River Basin (Washington Legislature, 2003; Washington Dept. of
Ecology, 2009). The state’s commitment to maintaining minimum instream flows created
a niche function for local mitigation water banks, particularly in fully allocated streams in
connection with highly utilized aquifers (Cronin and Fowler, 2012). Water banking is a
policy extension to Washington’s Trust Water Rights Program (Trust Program), which
was established in 1991 and provides authority for the state’s Department of Ecology
(DOE) to acquire and hold water rights in trust by the state. Water rights are acquired by
the DOE via lease, sale, purchase, donation, or agreement. “Trust water rights” can then
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Figure 2.4 Locations of Washington’s water resource inventory areas (WRIAs) in
brown outline and those hosting mitigation water banks (purple shaded areas). Note
that 15 privately water banks operate within the Yakima River Basin along with a
publicly operated banking entity. (Map courtesy of A. Welsh)
be rededicated to other uses such as instream flow maintenance or mitigating new uses.
Water banking interest in other watersheds prompted the legislature in 2009 to
expand the practice statewide (DOE, 2009). The legislation did not specifically define
how water banks were to be structured, thus allowing flexibility in their institutional
design to meet specific needs in Washington’s 62 watershed regions designated as “water
resource inventory areas” (DOE, 2021a). Water banks in the state can be operated by
public, quasi-public, non-profit, or private entities. Like other water banks in the U.S.
West, placement of water rights into the Trust Program is considered a beneficial use.
This stipulation protects water rights from forfeiture while held in the Trust Program and
incentivizes participation by negating prior appropriation’s fundamental “use it or lose it”
requirement. Water rights undergo different levels of appraisal by the DOE based on their
intended use and duration in the Trust Program. Rights accepted for use in water banking,
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also termed “mitigating” water rights, are fully evaluated to verify the right’s status and
to ensure their change in use does not impair other users (DOE, 2020).
Priority in access to trust water rights for rental does not typically involve a set
protocol as in Idaho’s Water Supply Bank. Water bank applicants are often in possession
of or have an arrangement with a water right holder before it is placed in the Trust
Program as a mitigating water right. Moreover, there is generally little competition for
candidate water rights to be selected in specific areas for mitigation banking, as there are
often a limited number of suitable water rights available to fulfill these needs (K. Collins,
personal communication, September 10, 2021). Once established, water banks can offer
mitigation credits to interested users seeking to acquire water in areas closed to new
development. Prices for credits vary considerably in the state and are often location
dependent. Private water banks in the Yakima River Basin have charged from $27,000 to
over $131,000 USD per acre foot of consumptive use, whereas prices in public/quasipublic or NGO water banks range from less than $1,000 to $11,000 per acre foot (Haller,
2018).
Washington’s decentralized water banking model has allowed various
stakeholders to experiment with water bank designs that provide water supply solutions
for new consumptive uses. Moreover, in response to concerns over administrative
inefficiency, speculative behavior, and water prices within certain banks, DOE has
continued to assess the rules and administration of the Trust Program (Sessions and
Christensen, 2020). Since 2009, 25 water banks have been established including in the
state’s wetter western region (DOE, 2021b). While the volumes of water transferred
through Washington’s water banks typically differ by orders of magnitude (DOE, 2021b),
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the expansion of water banks indicates that private and public interests alike have found
value in water banking’s adaptability for attaining specific legislatively defined goals.
Environmental Needs – Nebraska’s Central Platte Water Banking Program
In the U.S. West, overcommitment of rights to surface diversions and
groundwater withdrawals can artificially drive water scarcity. Such conditions compound
the administrative challenges of water provision for multiple competing needs. In the
state of Nebraska’s Platte River Basin (Figure 2.5), altered timing and availability of
natural flows due to consumptive uses of surface runoff and groundwater since the mid20th Century have impaired the habitat for multiple endangered species (Aiken, 1998).

Figure 2.5 Location of the Central Platte Natural Resources District
(purple shaded area) in the state of Nebraska. (Map courtesy of A. Welsh)

The evidence of habitat deterioration prompted the U.S. Department of Interior to initiate
a three state Cooperative Agreement (Agreement) in 1997 between Colorado, Wyoming,
and Nebraska (Jenkins, 1999). The Agreement set forth coordination of inter- and intra-
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state efforts to sustainably augment stream flow during key runoff periods in Nebraska’s
central Platte River corridor (USFWS, 2020). Seven years later, Nebraska’s Legislature
passed LB962, a bill directing the state’s local natural resources districts that govern
groundwater use to conjunctively manage surface flows and groundwater through
“integrated management plans” (IM Plans). LB962 was intended to bring over-allocated
watersheds into full allocation status and to bolster surface flows in meeting Agreement
objectives (Nebraska Legislature, 2004).
The Platte River’s critical habitat reaches are situated within the Central Platte
Natural Resources District (District). In 2007, the District implemented a water banking
program within its jurisdiction as part of its IM Plan and to contribute towards attaining
target flows in the critical habitat areas. The water bank came to fruition without
legislative or administrative directives at the state level and exemplifies a grassroots
response that used existing laws to meet meso level policy objectives (Lower Platte River
Basin Coalition (LPRBC), 2014). Moreover, the District sought to use water banking as a
voluntary incentive approach in lieu of administratively curtailing water use within the
district (Central Platte NRD, 2007). The banking program’s strategy was multi-faceted
through provision of an online water right trading platform for irrigators, use of
easements, incentivizing land use changes, and active market participation by the District
to acquire water rights to offset depletion of future uses (LPRBC, 2015). The District first
initiated retirement of irrigated lands in high impact areas via permanent easements
arranged with willing participants. District payments were dependent on the volume of
stream depletion saved in the watershed through the cessation of groundwater pumping,
with fixed rates starting at $3,750 per acre-foot and eventually increasing to $8,000 per
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acre-foot by 2012 (Colby, 2017). While Nebraska’s surface water administration utilizes
prior appropriation in the central Platte River corridor, groundwater is administered
within each of the state’s natural resources districts under a non-priority permit system.
The absence of meeting prior appropriation requirements contributed to expediting
transfers and lessening the administrative burdens for the Central Platte NRD’s water
bank by not having to evaluate for impairment to other water rights.
The acquisition of water rights has represented the bulk of the Central Platte
NRD’s water banking activity. After six years, the district acquired nearly 2,500 acre-feet
of groundwater rights to serve as future mitigation credits (Colby, 2017). The CPNRD
has recognized this practice as an effective policy tool that has contributed to meeting
mitigation goals in its first IM Plan iteration (Central Platte NRD, 2019). However, no
transactions occurred through the district’s online trading platform. The lack of interest
was attributed to skepticism among stakeholders of the potential financial earnings of
possible transfers, despite expressions of genuine interest in water banking prior to its
implementation (personal communication, B. Flyr, October 4, 2021). While this
component of the water bank program failed to cultivate robust water transfer activity,
the district has continued to include acquisition and banking of water rights (surface and
groundwater) as a strategy to meeting mitigation objectives and attaining fully
appropriated status in its most recent IM Plan iteration (Central Platte NRD, 2019).
Table 2.4 summarizes the findings to the framework of questions for each case water
bank example discussed in this section.
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Discussion
Examining the trajectory of water banking in the U.S. West through Livingston’s (2005)
micro and meso level institutional change factors has provided a structured evaluation to
understanding the question of why and how water institutions form, and how do they
change? At the micro level, the drivers of institutional change through water banks have
ranged from proactive anticipation of future stresses to reactive responses to drought or
endangered species protection. Moreover, these changes have originated at various tiers
of water governance. Traditional water markets are bilateral exchanges to fulfill
individuals’ needs wherein one entity retires their water use and sells their water right to
another user. Water banks, on the other hand, are the outcome of coordinated public
policies that utilize economic incentives to structure and steer such transactions to help
alleviate collectively defined water insecurities. At the meso level, water banks represent
institutional change achieved through retooling existing water allocation laws that
broaden the flexibility and expediency of the water transfer process within the
foundational structure of prior appropriation. These processes have occurred primarily
through legislation (constitutional level change) and the nesting of administrative and
operational rules within existing or new organizations. Moreover, constitutional level
changes delegate who creates the rules and how they are made.
Figure 2.6 describes five key takeaways from the regional trajectory and case
examples of water banks highlighted in this article. First, active water banks in the U.S.
West have been established and administered through different institutional processes. Of
the four case examples, water banks developed and operated solely at the state (Idaho)
and local levels (Nebraska) have contributed to meeting specific or broad policy
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Table 2.4 Summary of findings regarding the institutional reform factors referred to in
Table 2.2 for intermediary water banks that were established in response to unique water
insecurities in different locations of the U.S. West. Note: “ac-ft/yr” refers to acre-feet per
year (on acre-foot equals 326,000 gallons).
Scarcity-based
Asymmetries in Access to
Water

Aquifer
Overdraft
(Kansas)

(Idaho)

Specific Water
Insecurity
Drivers

§ Geographic imbalances in water
supply and demand due to
anticipated full- or over-appropriated
basins.

§ Withdrawals capped due to declining
aquifer levels that threatened long-term
groundwater supply and connected
stream flows.

Foundational
Actors

§ State legislators (informed by the
State Water Plan and historic water
transfer practices in upper Snake
River Basin).

§ State legislators and local
stakeholders.

Structure of
Implementation

§ “Top Down” Design – Enacted by the § “Hybrid” Design – Legislatively enacted,
Idaho State legislature.
allowing locally established water banks
to function as ‘not-for-profit”
§ The BWSB operated by the IWRB,
corporations.
rental pools managed by local water
districts.

Transformative
Rules and
Capacities

§
§
§
§

Centralized water rights access.
Reduced transaction costs for users.
Tailored rental arrangements.
“Self-Rentals” for water rights holders
to experiment with other uses of a
right.

§ Leases considered a beneficial use.

Integration of
Allocation Law
and Market
Principles

Adaptive
Responsiveness

Progress in
Attaining
Policy
Objectives

§ Portion of transferred water right
must remain in the aquifer.
§ Creation of safe deposits.
§ Expanded transfer distances.
§ Tailored rental arrangements.
§ Rentals applicable to all beneficial uses.
§ Leases considered a beneficial use.

§ Forfeiture protection and monetary
§ Sealed-bid auctions, prices defined
return for lessors depositing rights into
through bidding (not fixed).
the bank.
§ Priority status disregarded; new location
§ Fixed public rental prices, privately
of use must not interfere with existing
negotiated prices allowed.
wells.
§ Priority of rental assignments based
on when right was accepted by the
BWSB.

§ Leased water under “term-permits” and
junior to existing wells during lease.

§ Flexibility for new uses, such as
ecosystem services and water quality;
ongoing focus on administrative
efficiency and technology within the
BWSB.

§ Refinement of administrative and
operational rules occurs through 5-year
reviews, prior reviews have informed
legislative amendments.

§ Consistent activity in LRPs and
growing use of BWSB over last two
decades.

§ Increasing level of activity in recent years
(~ 3 transfers per year currently).

§ LRPs rentals exceed half a million
ac-ft/yr, BWSB ~75,000 ac-ft/yr.

§ High use of safe deposits among water
right holders (nearly 1,600 created since
inception of water bank).
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Mitigation of Competing Uses

Environmental Needs

(Washington)

(Nebraska)

Specific Water
Insecurity
Drivers

§ New demands in closed basins and state
level priorities for maintaining instream
flows.

§ Federally declared endangered
species due to surface and
groundwater diversions in an overallocated basin.

Foundational
Actors

§ State legislature, informed by local
advisory groups.

§ Leadership and stakeholders within
a local natural resources district.

Structure of
Implementation

§ “Hybrid” Design – Introduced by
legislation that designated the DOE to
oversee locally operated water banks as
part of the TWRP.

§ “Grassroots” Design – Locally
established program operating under
Nebraska’s existing water laws.

Transformative
Rules and
Capacities

§ Facilitates the water lease process for actors § Utilized an online trading platform
in lieu of bilateral negotiations.
for virtual “auctions” of water
rights.
§ Flexibility in design of individual water
banks to fit local contexts.
§ Relied on state’s directive to
manage groundwater and surface
water conjunctively.

Integration of
Allocation Law
and Market
Principles

Adaptive
Responsiveness

Progress in
Attaining
Policy
Objectives

§ Water right leases to the TWRP are
considered a beneficial use.
§ Leased water rights held by TWRP are
protected from forfeiture.
§ Prices for mitigation credits are not
restricted and location dependent.
§ Water banks have allowed for continued
economic activity in basins closed to new
uses.
§ Stakeholder input to the state has informed
policy reform efforts.

§ Groundwater rights governed
through correlative rights doctrine
and issued through non-priority
permits, negating issues of
forfeiture, beneficial use, and
evaluation for impairment.
§ Prices paid for retirement of water
rights responded to market signals.
§ Use of satellite imagery to verify
cessation of water use on retired or
converted cropland.

§ Since 2009, 25 individual water banks have § CPNRD continues to practice water
been created, intent of banks vary, and
banking to acquire water rights for
contribute to meeting water bank objectives
meeting mitigation goals and
in statute.
meeting mitigation targets in IM
Plan.
§ Water transfer platform no longer
used.
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Approaches to Successful Institutional Changes Vary – The trajectory of water
banks in the U.S. West shows that policy objectives can be attained whether
initiated and operated at the state level, locally, or through hybrid governance
approaches via state-level policy action with local administration.
Functionality Through Nested Rules – The modification or addition of new
rules that are hierarchically linked or “nested” between different levels of
governance have allowed water banks to fit within pre-existing water institutions.
The structure of nested rules is dependent on the institutional origins of water
banks. For example, at the legislative level, statutes define who is allowed to
operate a water bank and the level of oversight by the state. State agencies can
then establish specific design rules and objectives, and nested within these rules
can be the day-to-day operational rules of the individual water bank.
Multiple Adaptive Pathways – The water banks described herein have adapted to
changing needs through internal administrative efficiency improvements (Idaho)
as well as external processes that evaluate water bank performance and
recommend rule adjustments that respond to stakeholder needs and meeting
water bank objectives (Kansas).
Time and Institutional Commitment – The trajectory of water banks in the U.S.
West demonstrate that time and institutional commitment are critical factors in
determining whether intended objectives are met. Water banking activity in
Idaho did not become commonplace for nearly two decades after the program’s
establishment. The Central Kansas Water Bank experienced minimal interest in
water transfers initially. Now into its second decade, water transfers have
increased, and thousands of irrigators have established savings accounts. In
Nebraska, the Central Platte Natural Resources District dedicated millions of
dollars and staff resources to meeting water bank objectives as an intermediary
and active market participant.
“Success” is Context Dependent – Comparison of relative volumes of
transferred water reveals little about the overall attainment of water bank
objectives. This is due to differences in the jurisdictional areas served, the nature
of water rights, and the water sources handled by water banks. A more suitable
evaluative criterion is whether the water bank is progressing towards objectives
defined in legislation or charters. Activity levels over time may increase,
decrease, or fluctuate in response to episodic weather patterns or to the long-term
nature of the water insecurity that a water bank was designed to mitigate.

Figure 2.6 Key takeaways regarding how water banks have served as policy
tools in response to water insecurity in the U.S. West.
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objectives, as well as hybrid models that delegate shared responsibilities between state
agencies and local entities (Washington, Kansas). Second, within their jurisdiction, water
banks operate under specific rules that are nested within and connected to higher level
state water allocation laws. For example, Idaho’s local rental pools each define
operational rules that control access and pricing for rental water within their service
areas. Yet, these rules must be approved by the Idaho Water Resources Board, which was
granted the authority in the water banking statutes to review these rules. Third, as an
advantage over general water markets, water banks have exhibited the capacity to
administratively adapt to changing needs. In Idaho, for example, the water banking group
within the IDWR has continued to streamline the application and approval process for
users through a structured, calendar-based scheduling approach. Furthermore, the agency
utilizes updated hydrologic models of connected stream-aquifer systems in evaluating
potential water right rentals through the Board’s Water Supply Bank (R. Buyer, personal
communication, May 28, 2021). Fourth, patience should be exerted in the pursuit of
institutional change via water banks. The case examples demonstrate the payoffs over
time with having established rule structures and administrative capacities that can
respond to stakeholder needs. Moreover, a time commitment is critical in gaining
stakeholder trust and for the water user community to become aware of what water banks
offer for different interests (O. Feril, personal communication, September 17, 2021).
Finally, success of institutional change through water banking should be assessed through
evaluative criteria of whether water bank objectives are being met rather than sole
consideration of the volumes of water that are transferred. The diversity in water bank
applications in the U.S. West results inconsiderably different magnitudes of transfers
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annually. Whereas hundreds of thousands of acre-feet of transfers occur annually under
the Idaho Water Bank’s purview, several hundred acre-feet may satisfy the purpose of
mitigation banks in Washington. Essential evaluation criteria should include trends in use
by economic sector and geographic distribution as well as understanding exogenous
factors such as dynamics in commodity markets, seasonal weather patterns, or policy
developments that may spur broader interest in water banking.
Despite the applicability of water banks in addressing specific water insecurities
in the U.S. West, limitations in their utility remain. Institutional reform of water rights
administration has taken considerable periods of time and political will (Kenney, 2005),
particularly in relation to water reallocation. Stakeholder buy-in and institutional trust are
critical, as actors can often harbor suspicion toward policies reliant on their water rights
even for short-term durations (Anderson et al., 2018; Carney et al., 2021). Such socially
based challenges can lead to the case of southeastern Colorado’s Arkansas River Valley,
where a state-operated pilot water bank failed to complete a single transaction before
ceasing activity in the early 2000s (Simpson, 2005). Furthermore, despite the potential to
provide more equitable access to water, rules still that dictate what sectors have rights of
first refusal remain. For example, in Idaho’s local rental pools, each water district defines
what uses have priority in rental pool access, in what order, and at what price.
Conclusions
It has been nearly three decades since MacDonnell et al.’s (1994) comprehensive
review of water banks in the U.S. West. This article has assessed the present state of the
practice by illustrating the diversity in water bank applications as institutional responses
to collectively defined water insecurities. Activity and interest in water banking has
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ebbed and flowed over time, yet a clear trend is evident with ongoing experimentation in
their use to alleviate the effects of water scarcity in over-appropriated watersheds. While
water banks work primarily with short-term transactions to address scarcity, their
establishment as institutional structures can provide longer term support in water
management if banking entities accumulate enough water rights to support steady transfer
activity.
In recent years, concerns over reallocation by both administrative directives as
well as broader marketization of water in the U.S. West have been well documented
(Smith Jr., 2016; Chipman, 2020; Blevins, 2021). We argue that water banks fulfill a
niche role as a policy tool of compromise. They function in a policy space between
approaches that view water as a commodity and foundational elements of water law that
recognize the public ownership and trust responsibilities involved in its allocation. By
integrating collectively defined and state-backed rule structures with economic
incentives, water banks enhance access to water while protecting those interests willing
to temporarily relinquish their water rights. Moreover, as Meinzen-Dick (2007) stressed
in her assessment of water institutions, water markets alone are not panaceas. Attempts to
advance institutions that govern water allocation must rely on a “tripod” in which the
state, collective groups, and the market each play a role. As the U.S. West continues to
confront the challenges of multiple coinciding water insecurities, water banks and similar
reallocation policies will be vital to enabling greater flexibility in sharing an increasingly
scarce resource.
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CHAPTER III
THE ACCUMULATING INTEREST IN WATER BANKS: ASSESSING THEIR ROLE
IN MITIGATING WATER INSECURITIES1

Abstract
Reallocation is often promoted as a response to the U.S. West’s growing water
insecurity. Water banking is a form of reallocation utilized in several western states to
facilitate temporary water rights transfers. This article frames and examines water
banking’s potential influences on water security from a hydro-social perspective through
a case analysis of water banking policy in Utah. It analyzes challenges of integrating the
market-based economic incentives of water banks with the legal precedents of the prior
appropriation doctrine to reallocate water in over-appropriated basins with hydrologically
interdependent uses. Key-informant interviews and focus groups were used to examine
water security’s meaning to stakeholders and analyze how water banking could affect the
water security of disparate users and uses at multiple scales. Stakeholders predominately
saw water security as assurance in water quantity, but water security was further equated
by participants with the legal protections afforded by water rights. Multiple complexities
in water bank implementation are to be expected when multi-scalar contexts are
considered, including societal and hydrologic tradeoffs in settings with diverse and
interconnected interests. Our research shows that examining the potential ramifications of
water banking policy through stakeholder perspectives can reveal nuanced insights on

1

Co-Authors: Joanna Endter-Wada and Lisa Welsh. Formatted to the specifications of the Journal
of the American Water Resources Association.
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individual and collective water security issues not only within Utah, but other arid
regions in general.
Introduction
Water transfers within and between economic sectors are frequent in the western
United States (U.S. West) (Brewer et al. 2007; Garrick et al. 2018). Yet, some economists
contend that market-based reallocation is still an under-utilized approach to alleviate the
region’s escalating water insecurities that are rooted in increasingly scarce water supplies,
new priorities for non-consumptive uses, water quality degradation, and climate change
(Gleick 2010; Crimmel 2014; Culp et al. 2014; Hansen 2015; Milly and Dunne 2020;
Overpeck and Udall 2020). Water markets are promoted to address collective scale
challenges through moving water to its “highest and best use” by incentivizing monetary
compensation for water rights access at the individual scale (Easter et al. 1999; Iseman et
al. 2012). Water transfers in the U.S. West typically involve private leases or sales of
individual rights to use a public resource, and often require legal and engineering
consultation and administrative approval to avoid impairing other users. Hence,
transaction costs and potential third-party impacts can limit market activity (Libecap
2012).
To minimize obstacles to water markets, many states in the U.S. West have
implemented or sanctioned water banks – public or private institutional entities devised
to facilitate temporary water rights transfers in a structured, incentive-based water leasing
system (MacDonnell et al. 1994; Clifford et al. 2004). Water banks vary in design and
purpose but, in the U.S. West, each must work within the prior appropriation doctrine –
the ubiquitous legal water allocation system of states in this region (Getches et al. 2009).
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Water banks incentivize temporary water reallocation by: 1) reducing fiscal and
administrative burdens common to private permanent water transfers; 2) offering lessors
potential financial gain in exchange for lessees’ payment for temporary access to water;
and 3) providing water access for more recently recognized beneficial uses such as
ecosystem services or recreation (Montilla-López et al. 2016). Although location
dependent, water banks are generally intended to address specific or multiple water
insecurities at individual and societal scales (Cronin and Fowler 2012).
However, reliance on market principles to transfer rights to use water is not
without risks from changes to the allocation system that traditional water users are
accustomed to under prior appropriation law. The existing allocation system has provided
relative certainty and predictability in water deliveries for holders of water rights
acquired through administrative procedures under this law. Without effective governance
during a transition to a new allocation rule, existing water users could be threatened, and
new water insecurities could arise for individuals and ecosystems alike (Meinzen-Dick
and Ringler 2008; Breviglieri et al. 2018). Cultivating water banking’s potential benefits
and circumventing possible externalities depends on how water banks are designed and
governed as well as stakeholder interest and trust in new institutional mechanisms
involving the temporary transfer of water rights, which in the U.S. West are privatelyowned usufructuary rights to use a public resource in perpetuity.
This article presents research on water banking as part of allocation policy reform
and its connection to individual and collective water security through the perspectives of
stakeholders and water leaders in the state of Utah. Situated in the heart of the U.S. West,
Utah’s water resources challenges are representative of those faced across much of this
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region, where states and localities are grappling with competing water supply demands in
the face of climate change impacts that are intensifying droughts and altering hydrologic
regimes (Overpeck and Udall 2020). Established water banks in the U.S. West vary in
function and form largely due to historical and institutional particularities in each
locality. Their slow adoption begs a more in-depth look at how policy and institutional
change comes about, how a policy reform like water banking is anticipated in advance,
and how clearly the problems water banks are intended to solve are defined and agreed
upon. We look at these questions through the lens of water security where the generalities
of our findings are to be found.
Our policy-oriented research was conducted during a period when the state of
Utah debated and passed its 2020 water banking legislation to meet multiple policy
objectives (Table 3.1) (2020 Utah Senate Bill 26; Utah Code 73-31). We relied on keyinformant, semi-structured interviews and focus groups with individuals who have varied
professional and personal connections to water, including leadership roles in water policy
at the state and local levels. The research objectives were to understand the meanings
people ascribed to “water security” and the potential role of water banking in improving
water security in the context of the U.S. West using Utah as an example. This analysis
contributes to the water security literature through a nuanced examination of the interface
between water security and water reallocation in the context of a highly industrialized
country. It demonstrates place-specific dependency of how water security can be
interpreted, identifies tradeoffs that could ensue from implementing water banks, and
offers stakeholder insights on ways to fairly ameliorate these tradeoffs. Such stakeholderbased information, as suggested by Marston and Cai (2016), could be vital in the quest
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Table 3.1 Potential functions for water banks in Utah defined in the state’s 2017
Recommended State Water Strategy (top), and water banking objectives (bottom) defined
in Utah Code following passage of Senate Bill 26 in February 2020.

Potential Functions of Water Banks Recognized in Utah’s Recommended
1
State Water Strategy
• Add flexibility for users in the agricultural sector to improve
water quantity and quality management (Recommendation 3.5)
• Create a source of water for dedication to instream flows
(Recommendation 4.2)
• Facilitate temporary transfers and shared use arrangements (i.e. –
split season leases) (Recommendation 9.5)
• A water source and exchange mechanism in the state’s critical
groundwater management areas (Recommendation 9.6)
2

Objectives of water banks articulated in Utah’s 2020 Water Banking Act
Promote (Utah Code 73-31-S104(1))
(a) the optimal use of the public’s water;
(b) transparency and access to water markets;
(c) temporary, flexible, and low cost water transactions between
water
users; and,
(d) Utah’s agricultural economy by providing access to water
resources and
income for Utah’s agricultural industry; and
Facilitate (Utah Code 73-31-S104(2))
(a) robust and sustainable agricultural production while meeting
growing municipal and industrial water demands, such as
fallowing arrangements;
(b) water quality improvement;
(c) water rights administration and distribution; and
(d) a healthy and resilient natural environment.
1

Governor’s State Water Strategy Advisory Team’s 2017 Recommended State Water
Strategy (accessed July 2020, https://envisionutah.org/utah-water-strategy-project)

2
Utah’s Water Banking Act became effective 5/12/2020 and can be found in Utah
Code, Title 73, Chapter 31 (accessed July 2020,
https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title73/Chapter31/73-31.html)
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to utilize economic-based incentives to reallocate water in stressed watersheds across the
U.S. West.
Connecting Water Security and Water Reallocation
The Water Security Concept
The water security concept is utilized across multiple disciplines to frame and
assess the planet’s water resources dilemmas (Cook and Bakker 2012; Garrick and Hall
2014). Use of the term gained momentum in the 1990s through discourse on inequitable
access to freshwater resources and sanitary conditions in low-income nations
(Falkenmark and Lundqvist 1998; United Nations 2000; Tarlock and Wouters 2010).
Water security’s conceptual meaning and relevancy continue to be debated and
interpreted, however (Gober et al. 2015; Zeitoun et al. 2016; Jepson et al. 2017a; Gerlak
et al. 2018). Definitions generally reference assurance of access to suitable quantities of
sufficient quality water for human and ecosystem needs, economic advancement, and
resilience to chronic stresses and immediate crises (Zeitoun et al. 2016). Water security’s
scale of application has ranged from households to the nation-state (Lautze and
Manthrithilake 2012; Jepson et al. 2017b; Wutich et al. 2017) and has included numerous
assessment indicators (Norman et al. 2013; Srinivasan et al. 2017). Gerlak et al. (2018)
assert from their water security-based research worldwide that the concept is
“simultaneously a condition to be measured, a framework for decision making, and a
policy objective.”
Grey et al.’s (2013) definition of water security as “a tolerable level of waterrelated risk to society” captures a more recent trend of seeing water security as a riskbased concept (Garrick and Hope 2013; Hall and Borgomeo 2013). From an engineering

71
and systems design standpoint, water security through assurance of specified quantities of
water of a desired quality is inextricably linked to the concepts of reliability (the
likelihood of a source or system failing to produce or deliver water), vulnerability (the
consequences of source or system failure), and resiliency (the capacity to absorb negative
impacts to the source or system) (Hashimoto et al. 1982; Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change 2012; Kumar 2015). While risk-based framing considers tolerability to
different water stresses, Pahl-Wostl et al. (2013) challenge how tolerability can be
defined for individuals and societies with vast disparities in access to natural and
economic resources.
Recent discourse on water security considers human dimensions of inequality,
adaptive capacity, and broader inclusion of stakeholders in policy processes (Kirchhoff et
al. 2016; Zeitoun et al. 2016). Zeitoun (2013) calls for use of data from social science
disciplines in water security research to examine the inherent potential for policies to
establish winners and losers; or, as the author succinctly noted, the question of “Water
security for whom?” Zeitoun et al. (2016) further observe that past water security
assessments took “reductionist” approaches (i.e., quantified, risk-based solutions that
simplify water resource dilemmas) but should instead strive for “integrative” pathways
that recognize environmental and societal uncertainties and account for allocation
inequities. Jepson et al.’s (2017a) relational water security framework further builds on
the societal connections to water, envisioning water security as ensuring individuals the
ability to “engage with and benefit from” the “hydro-social cycle.” This construct refers
to the processes “through which water and society shape and reshape each other to
produce new hydrosocial arrangements over space and time” that support “human
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capabilities and wellbeing.” The relational water security framework recognizes water
not simply as a substance without meaning, but “produced as a particular ‘water’,
materially and discursively, and within specific moments, contexts, and relations” (Budds
et al. 2014). Furthermore, water security is viewed as a process rather than a static
objective and transcends the notion of water as a physical resource being secured, but
rather the “wider relations through which water is organized by humans and shapes
people’s lives” (Jepson et al. 2017a, p. 47). Research on perceptions of water security has
demonstrated the importance of understanding how people in different contexts view the
concept for water policy reform efforts and adaptations to droughts and climate change
(Strickert et al. 2015; Gober et al. 2015; Budds 2018; Wheeler and Marning 2019).
Water security through market-based transfers?
Economists consider water reallocation through market mechanisms as an
approach to alleviate scarcity by moving water to what is characterized as the “highest
and best use” evaluated in monetary terms (Grafton et al. 2011; Easter and Huang 2014).
While this notion makes classic economic theory assumptions such as perfect information
for market participants, water market performance in reality is dependent on a multitude
of contextual factors, including local allocation laws and transfer rules, water right
attributes, hydrology, infrastructure, institutional transition costs, transaction costs for
participants, and third-party impact mitigation (Garrick and Hope 2013; Marston and Cai
2016). These factors directly influence the assurance of water quantity and quality,
ecosystem services, and water for societal health and economic progress – the
foundational elements of water security – in localities where reallocation occurs (Chong
and Sunding 2006). As a water marketing variant, water banks in some U.S. states have
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mitigated these performance issues, such as Idaho’s state-operated water supply bank and
rental pool system (Clifford et al. 2004) that resulted in steady transfer activity and flow
augmentation in the lower Snake River Basin (Idaho Water Resource Board 2019a,
2019b) and a central Nebraska water bank that helped attain target flow rates to improve
environmental water security in the Platte River corridor (Colby 2017).
Water markets in general have drawn criticism over their functional inefficiencies
(Matthews 2004), commodification of a public resource (Dellapenna 2005), and
incapacity to consider both public values and private interests in proposed transactions
(Matthews 2010). Water use in the U.S. West often involves interconnected uses and
hydrologic interdependencies that have underpinned competitive as well as cooperative
efforts to increase water use security in the face of scarcity (Endter-Wada et al. 2009).
Inescapable physical and social realities complicate the water security balancing act
between transaction participants and other interests potentially impacted by water
reallocation (including ecosystems) (National Research Council 1992; Matthews 2003;
Goemans and Pritchett 2014). Internationally, Bauer’s (1997, 2004) case analysis of
water markets in Chile under a neo-liberal regime reveals that even under a laissez-faire
economy, water markets are “unavoidably complicated” and “should be approached with
care and modest expectations” due to cultural practices, politics, legalities, institutional
designs, and local geography. The benefits of water markets in Australia’s MurrayDarling Basin for drought mitigation, financial gains in the agricultural sector, and
environmental flow enhancements were only achieved through substantial institutional
and water entitlement reform that facilitated the capacity to trade permanent and seasonal
water entitlements, and through several billion dollars of federal investments committed
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to purchasing water entitlements for instream flows (Connor and Kaczan 2013; Wheeler
et al. 2014; Grafton et al. 2016).
Prior Appropriation and Water Security
Central to this research is understanding how operating water banks in the context
of the established legalities of prior appropriation and investments in built infrastructure
systems characteristic of the U.S. West could influence water security. The existing legal
priority-based allocation system affords security to entities who possess senior water
rights under state water law but creates insecurities for people with junior prior
appropriation rights or unrecognized federal claims who have had to seek other legal
means to secure access to water. Prior appropriation was the means through which
European-American settlements and extractive industries of an expanding U.S. market
economy were established in a drought-prone physiological setting that was subject to
large spatial and temporal variability in water supply. This state-based water allocation
doctrine expropriated water along with land from indigenous peoples and gave European
settlers who invested in putting water to recognized beneficial uses the legal assurance of
water access in perpetuity. It was designed to curtail economic speculation as was
occurring in land markets at the time and establish orderliness in water distribution, so
users knew their annual apportionment under variable climatic conditions (Worster,
1985).
Prior appropriation influenced social relations with water, particularly in
agricultural communities where mutual irrigation (canal) companies helped establish
collective security for their shareholders’ individual enterprises. As natural waterways
were diverted for agriculture and other industrial uses, intricate hydrologic
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interdependencies were created through reliance on return flows and storage facilities that
were subsequently used by junior appropriators (Endter-Wada et al. 2009). This
interdependency structured an equilibrium in the hydro-social cycle in irrigated areas
across the U.S. West. While this structure contributed to western expansion in the 19th
Century and economic prosperity in the 20th Century (Wilkinson, 1992), societal and
climate change pressures on water resources in the 21st Century have raised issues of
water availability and equity in access. Climate change-reduced flows now observed in
the U.S. West (Udall and Overpeck 2017) create water management challenges because
prior appropriation allocated set quantities instead of using pro-rata burden sharing
approaches to scarcity as used in other allocation systems (Hanemann and Young 2020).
Thus, prior appropriation is limited in its ability to deal with growing threats to the water
security of junior water rights holders, unfulfilled tribal claims, and new interests seeking
access to water rights.
Garrick and Hall (2014) argue that in many settings, institutional reform is a key
pathway to water security, but notes that the potential for reform is context dependent and
influenced by existing path dependency from earlier policy choices. Utah’s commitment
to prior appropriation and financial investment in existing water systems is such a case of
institutional path dependency (McCool 1995). While the doctrine’s utility in modern
times has been questioned (Wilkinson 1989; Benson 2012; MacDonnell 2015), the state
of Utah has pledged it “will remain the bedrock principle of Utah’s water law” because
“too many economic decisions have been made on the strength and security of priorities
to abandon the doctrine” (Governor’s State Water Strategy Advisory Team (GSWSAT)
2017). States throughout the region have modified the doctrine over time through
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legislation and court rulings as a means to maintain the basic structure but increase its
flexibility, such as through passage of water banking laws.
The Influence of Scale
Moss and Newig (2010) describe scalar problems arising in environmental issues
due to disparities in spatial relations between biophysical processes, administrative
structures, and individual preferences. Furthermore, because water “works across
multiple scales” that affect different uses, sectors, and ecosystems, governance of the
resource must also shift upward to the national or supranational scale or downward to the
regional or local scale (Moss and Newig 2010). Garrick and Hall (2014) argue that the
water security concept “seeks to address disparate dimensions of water-related risk in an
integrated way,” and that framing different water challenges in terms of water security
extends “across all dimensions of water, the full range of impacts, and indirect
consequences and spill-overs up to a global scale.” Scale considerations are imperative in
assessing the water security implications of reallocation. Adverse outcomes from water
transfers in parts of the U.S. West historically (Reisner 1993; Sanchez 2014) have
demonstrated reallocation’s impact on water security at societal scales beyond the
participants in the water transfer and have also led to recent public pushback where rural
to urban transfers have been considered (Welsh and Endter-Wada 2017a, 2017b). Scale
issues in water bank governance can emerge from institutional design factors and the
jurisdictional extent granted to the managing entity. The scale of a water bank’s reach
will determine who can participate in a given area, what infrastructure resources are
available, and the potential impacts transfers could have on other users and the
environment (MacDonnell et al. 1994). Scale increases are likely to add complexity in

77
water banking governance, akin to Garrick et al.’s (2018) observation of increasing
complexity in water markets as they increase in size across different jurisdictional
boundaries. Understanding scale impacts can also be critical in optimizing system
dynamics (Gibson et al. 2000), which in the case of water banks, can assist in identifying
where robust activity is most likely to occur and where to focus resources such as
metering and hydrologic modeling.
Methods
This research was initiated in spring 2018 in response to growing interest and
policy debate in Utah over formulating water banking legislation. Structured research was
conducted to gather interview and focus group data, and members of the research team
were also participant-observers of public policy discussions that resulted in passage of
Utah’s Water Banking Act in 2020. Our research goal was to gather information on water
banks elsewhere, and how stakeholders in the study area anticipated their potential
application in northern Utah.
Study Area
Northern Utah is situated in the Intermountain West region of the U.S. West and
straddles the Colorado River and Great Basins. The region’s hydrology is snowmelt
driven (> 140 cm/year) via catchments in the Wasatch and Uinta Mountains (Gillies and
Ramsey 2009). This runoff supports Utah’s most productive farmlands, vital ecosystems,
and the highly urbanized Wasatch Front metropolitan area of 2.4 million people (U.S.
Department of Agriculture 2019; U.S. Census Bureau 2019). Utah’s rapid growth rate
coupled with its historical trend as one of the top U.S. states in per capita domestic water
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use (674 l/d) further complicates water management efforts in the state (Dieter et al.
2018; Richards 2020).
Northern Utah’s Bear River watershed (Figure 3.1) is a mixed rural-urban region
of particular interest due to rampant pressures on the watershed from multiple competing
sectors and state plans to divert runoff for Wasatch Front municipalities. The Bear
River’s average annual yield of 1,100 Mm3 supplies approximately 60 percent of the

Figure 3.1 Study area features in the Bear River watershed
(map courtesy of A. Welsh).
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inflow to the iconic Great Salt Lake. The river also supports extensive wetlands that
provide critical avian habitat (Downard and Endter-Wada 2013; Downard et al. 2014;
Wurtsbaugh et al. 2016; Edwards and Null 2019). Upstream of these wetlands, the Bear
River supports 194,000 acres (78,509 hectares) of irrigated agriculture in Cache Valley
and Box Elder County (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2019). Four major canal
companies and independent irrigators in Utah and Idaho rely on storage in Bear Lake for
irrigation water that supplements natural flow water rights. Thus, the multiple
jurisdictions, legal arrangements, and competing sectors bring considerable institutional
design challenges for potential water banks.
Research Procedures
Data Gathering Protocol and Design. A formal data gathering protocol was
designed for conducting semi-structured interviews and focus groups (Weiss 1994;
Neuman 2011) and approved by USU’s Institutional Review Board (Protocol #9393).
The protocol contained three sections: A) questions focused on stakeholders’ connections
to water, current water challenges, and strategies for addressing them; B) perspectives on
water banking, problems water banks could help address, and opportunities and
challenges involved in water banking implementation; and, C) views on water security,
including its meaning, whether water banks could improve water security, and how Utah
could most fairly deal with potential tradeoffs in promoting water security. Appropriate
for policy research, this approach yielded rich, qualitative, textual content that captured
stakeholder perspectives on water banking and its potential impacts on individual and
collective water security.
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Interview and Focus Group Administration. Research participants were
recruited through two sampling approaches. First, we used purposive, reputational
sampling which involves researchers utilizing inclusion criteria and exercising judgment
to identify and prioritize people most relevant for the research. This non-randomized
recruitment approach is appropriate for policy-related research where detailed
information is sought from people most involved and knowledgeable about the research
subject. Accordingly, individuals representative of diverse stakeholder groups with
connections to the water banking conversation in Utah and Bear River watershed
governance were invited to participate in the study. Secondly, additional participants
were recruited via the snowball sampling method whereby the project’s initial
interviewees recommended other individuals with particular knowledge on aspects of the
research topic. This aided in prioritizing some people already identified and expanding
our list of potential participants in certain categories. Third, key informants in other states
were sought based on their specific experience in operating water banks or expertise in
water reallocation in the U.S. West.
Participants provided informed consent prior to the interview or focus group
sessions. Data acquisition occurred from July 2018 through April 2019. All but two
participants chose to reveal their identity for acknowledgement and all but three sessions
were conducted in person. Each session was audio recorded with participant permission
and ranged in duration from 45 to 180 minutes. Most sessions were conducted by two or
more members of the research team.
The study recruited 76 stakeholders representing diverse connections to water in
northern Utah (64) and other U.S. western states (12). Over one-third of the participants

81
from Utah were involved in agriculture (34.3%). Collectively, stakeholders with water
conservancy districts or canal companies (26.6%) and environmental advocacy groups
(23.4%) represented half of the study’s participants from Utah. The remaining
interviewees were connected to water through government agencies (state or federal),
industry, legal firms, municipalities, private consultancies, academia, or the state
legislature. Slightly less than half (47%) of the participants were from Cache Valley, with
the remainder from Box Elder County, the Bear Lake area, or the Wasatch Front. Over 92
percent of the participants or the entities they represented hold or have held water rights
or water shares, and over 40 percent have transferred a water right or share. Participants
from Idaho, Washington, Wyoming, and Colorado were connected to water through state
agencies, the legal field, academia, state government, or water conservancy districts.
Over 80 percent of the non-Utah participants were affiliated with state agencies or legal
firms.
Data Management and Analysis. Audio recordings of each session were
transcribed for later coding. Transcriptions were saved to password protected storage
systems to safeguard participants’ information. Data transcripts were analyzed by
multiple team members using a multi-step coding process (Neuman 2011; Saldaña 2015)
with Microsoft Word and NVivo 12 coding software (QSR International). The initial
coding sequence provided general themes to the participants’ responses, to which more
specific sub-themes were extracted in a second coding phase. The third step involved
extracting specific participant quotes to support individual sub-themes defined in the first
two coding phases. The data presented in this article is based on this structure of general
to specific themes and supporting stakeholder insights via illustrative quotes.
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Results and Discussion
This section presents our analysis of responses to questions and discussion
relating water banking and water security. Given participants’ diverse experiences with
water, responses often included individual as well as organizational, philosophical, and
practical perspectives.
Contextualized Meaning of Water Security
Water security cannot be pursued in the abstract. Promoting water security requires
understanding what it means to people with varying connections to water in different
contexts. Participants were asked the open-ended question: “What does the term ‘water
security’ mean to you?” Interviewees provided 111 responses, with nearly half of the
participants articulating multiple perspectives. Data coding resulted in 12 categories of
responses (Table 3.2), revealing the multi-dimensional nature of water security in this
particular geographic and social context. The top six categories listed include descriptions
of the coded meanings of water security and the number of different vocational
connections to water that participants to each category held. Six additional categories
recognized by three percent or less of the participants are also listed. Of the top six
categories, several relate to common water security themes found in the literature,
including suitable water quantity, water quality, protection of aquatic systems, and the
physical protection of water resources and infrastructure. The concepts of risk and
uncertainty were not themes that interviewees explicitly associated with water security,
however. The notion of water security as a condition provided through the possession of
water rights and legal protections to maintain access was the second highest meaning
offered by participants. Although this theme is not found in common water security
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Table 3.2 The top six coded responses to the interview question - “what does the term
‘water security’ mean to you?” The second column describes each meaning, and the third
column lists how many different stakeholder groups with whom participants recognizing
each meaning were affiliated.
Water Security Meaning
(Proportion of participants
identifying this meaning in
parentheses)

Description of Meaning

No. of
Different
Stakeholder
Groups

Reliability in Quantity
(59%)

The availability and reliability of expected
quantities of water for basic needs and
livelihoods.

10

Water Rights and Legal
Security (32%)

The possession of water rights or shares,
or the legal safeguards within the prior
appropriation system that ensure their
utility.

7

Infrastructure Protection
(21%)

The protection of water infrastructure
(impoundment, conveyance, treatment)
from physical or cyber threats, or the
maintenance/replacement of aging systems.

7

Water Quality Protection
(9%)

Maintaining water quality standards to
ensure suitable water quality conditions for
human consumption and aquatic habitats.

4

Water Governance (8%)

Water resources management processes
that include citizen and community-level
involvement.

4

Watershed Protection (5%)

Protection and enhancement of natural
aquatic systems (i.e. - rivers, lakes,
wetlands, aquifers, municipal source
water catchment areas).

3

definitions from the literature (Zeitoun et al., 2016), these responses relate to Garrick and
Hall’s (2014) observation that “well-defined property rights are a foundation for water
security.”
Roughly one in three participants recognized the importance of water rights and
the legal protection of the access provided through those rights. Most of the Utah
participants have held water rights or water shares, either personally or through affiliated
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organizations. Over half of the participants that shared this meaning were connected to
water through irrigated agriculture or the legal field. A northern Utah farmer exemplifies
this perspective as follows:
What that [water security] means to me is that no one can come in and
take my water right away, not meaning that I can do anything I want
with that water right, but I don’t think anyone should be able to come in
once you have gone through the process of getting that water right, and
be able just to take it.
Protecting water rights is how availability and reliability in water quantity is
provided under prior appropriation water law. Some of the responses categorized under
this meaning did not specifically mention water rights but referred to legal safeguards on
the prior appropriation system as a whole and eliminating political interference, as
illustrated here:
Another thing I think that needs to be about the water security is
the fact that political interests can’t supersede law. That has to be a
rule of law.
The physical protection of water and water infrastructure, including from cyber or
bio-chemical threats, natural disasters, or aging systems was recognized as the meaning
of water security for 21% of the participants from seven different vocation connections to
water. The responses from several stakeholders interviewed, including managers of water
distribution or treatment systems demonstrate how water systems vulnerabilities are
considered in a post-9/11 world as shown below by quotes from two Cache Valley
participants:
The first thing that I think of is how high is the fence and how big are
the locks… you could kill everybody in Cache Valley that is not on a
private well in 24 hours without trying very hard.
Well, when I first hear the term, the first word that comes into my mind
is terrorism protection.
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The threats to conveyance systems and water supply in northern Utah due to natural
disasters - such as from seismic activity were also identified by participants:
I mean, Logan City gets most of their water from a 32-inch pipe that
comes out of Logan Canyon. 32-inch pipe. What happens if that
earthquake comes and breaks that pipe? Not only will it wash out half
of the mountain and flood homes in Logan, but every Logan resident is
not going to have water.
The responses to the question of water security’s meaning demonstrate the
diversity in individual connections to water. Yet, the notion of water security as a factor
of governance and legal mechanisms was highly prevalent within the coded responses.
The importance of water rights to stakeholders from different categories reveals the
predominance that prior appropriation law has in the livelihoods and culture of the study
area, whether from those with seniority in time for agriculture or new interests seeking
access for emerging priorities.

Water Security through Water Banking?
In the context of Utah seeking new ways to deal with growing water insecurities,
we also asked research participants: “Do you think water banks can improve water
security in a) Cache Valley and b) in Utah?” For participants outside of Utah, the
question was asked more generally in terms of whether they thought water banking could
improve water security at regional and state scales. The responses were mixed among the
79% participants who voiced a clear opinion, with 6% remaining unsure about what they
thought and 15% having no response mostly due to time constraints that did not allow the
question to be asked or adequately discussed.
The largest proportion (43%) was generally optimistic and believed that “Yes,” it
was likely. This segment included most of the participants from the legal field and
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environmental NGOs in addition to some affiliates with state agencies, half of whom
were from the Idaho Department of Water Resources. It should be noted that water
banking has been practiced in Idaho for several decades. Despite trepidation shared by
participants in farming with regard to the transfer of water away from agriculture, about
60% of those in agriculture believed water banking could positively influence water
security. Participants noted various reasons for their optimism, including the policy of
“banked” water rights being protected from forfeiture and more flexible access to
additional water for users in need of it. In the case of Cache Valley, participants hoped
water banking would be an avenue to demonstrate to state administrators that more of the
valley’s pool of water rights were in use and, thus, “their” water (originating in the
valley) would be less susceptible to what they perceived as the threat of the state
declaring it forfeited or abandoned under provisions of prior appropriation law.
Another 29% of participants that represented eight different connections to water
saw water banks “Potentially” having a positive influence on water security. Nearly 37%
of these responses were from stakeholders working for state agencies in Utah and Idaho.
These participants generally expressed some reservations, with one Utah participant
noting they were “optimistically skeptical” about the prospects for water banking’s
success in the state. About half of the responses from participants affiliated with
environmental NGOs were in this category, as well as nearly one-quarter of all
participants in agriculture. Responses coded to this category were typified by statements
suggesting hesitancy in believing that water banks could unequivocally or effectively
increase water security. They often included caveats regarding water banking institutional
design and administration, challenges of local conditions, and the need to couple them
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with other water demand management tools. The following passage from a Wasatch
Front environmental NGO representative exemplifies some of this ambiguity:
They [water banks] certainly could, but it doesn’t mean that they will. In
general, they could create more cooperation, more of a sense that we kind of
have this shared resource and we are in it together and the less we use, the
more we have next year. But if not done properly, they don’t necessarily do
that. They create this illusion that we have more water and people then use
more and the environment is left out of the equation. So, it kind of depends.
But I could certainly see a scenario where yes, they would help us as one of
the tools in our toolbox.
Another 8% of the participants firmly believed that “No,” water banking will not
improve water security. This position was held by affiliates with environmental NGOs,
industry, federal agencies, the legal field, and a Utah state agency. One participant
suggested that water banking may just result in water security being exchanged:
Right off I would say no, just because it seems that you are dealing with the
existing supply already and transferring water, I guess. It would increase the
security for one user but at the detriment of another user. Thinking about the
water bank transfer and the existing supply from one user to another, to the
extent that you balance that it’s not really a change in water security overall,
but one user might reduce their water security or increase it for another.
This question was administered toward the end of the interview or focus group
after considerable discussion about water challenges and water banking. Previous
questions invited participants to speak to their personal and occupational experiences.
This question specifically asked about anticipated effects of water banking on water
security at local and state levels. Consequently, the responses to this question generally
involved explanations of how stakeholders anticipated water banks would increase or
decrease water security at various scales (individual, watershed-community, state). The
next section analyzes these responses in greater depth.
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What (in)security for whom at what scale?
Explanations for water banking’s potential influences on water security focused
on the participants’ primary interpretations of the concept and how they saw water banks
either increasing or decreasing the water security of individuals (e.g., themselves, people
they know, hypothetical people in certain positions), their local area of residence, or their
state. Stakeholder insights were nuanced and revealed potential conflicts or
contradictions, typically from water banking’s countervailing scalar influences. These
contradictions thus beg more careful consideration of the question: “What water
(in)security for whom at what scale?”
Participants’ explanations were analyzed and categorized first according to the
meaning of water security embedded in their responses, secondly according to the nature
of the anticipated influence, and thirdly according to the hydro-social scale at which the
influence would occur. Nearly all of the explanations related to potential water banking
influences on either increasing or decreasing security in water quantity reliability and
availability (Table 3.3), security of water rights/entitlements (Table 3.4), or water
security through governance (Table 3.5). Within these tables, the nature of anticipated
water banking influences is described (short phrases) and displayed according to the scale
of the influence, and example stakeholder comments are quoted as illustrations. The
individual scale included effects on individuals or entities holding water rights who could
be affected by water banking activity. The watershed-community scale refers to
proximate human communities and aquatic ecosystems in either a segment or entirety of
a watershed setting in which a water bank would likely operate. The state scale refers to
actions and consequences of water banks that would influence the state’s overall water

89
supply and contribute towards attaining or impeding state policy objectives for water
banks.
Despite the generally favorable attitudes among stakeholders regarding water
banks positively influencing water security, Tables 3.3-3.5 illustrate the water security
complexities that emerge when reallocation through water banking is considered in light
of what water security means to people in this hydro-social context and in a multi-scalar
analytic frame. The tables also illustrate potential conflicts or contradictions. We
highlight examples in the remainder of this section using themes from each table.
The first example involves an anticipated offsetting influence of water banking
across hydro-social scales through pursuit of state-wide reallocation policy objectives by
appealing to individual self-interest through market-based incentives. While Utah’s
RSWS called for the use of water banks to incentivize redistribution of water between
different uses (GSWSAT 2017, p. 88), farmers in northern Utah, working in a sector that
holds some of the region’s most senior water rights, saw the influence of water banks on
reliability in water quantity and availability differently (Table 3.3). At the watershedcommunity scale (upper half of Table 3.3), participants in agriculture commonly
envisioned water banks improving water security within their livelihood by providing
supplemental water to expand irrigated agriculture. This influence is counterintuitive to
the policy argument for water reallocation. In lieu of reducing the high proportion of
agricultural use of developed water supplies and marketing conserved water to meet other
needs (i.e., for ecosystem services), many farmers saw water banking as a way for water
to stay within agriculture. Some Cache Valley farmers foresaw water banks also

Table 3.3 Themes in stakeholder responses regarding potential water banking influences on security in water quantity
reliability/availability.
Scale and water banking influence
Individual
- Option for affordable single-season/in-season
access for users
- Increased market access for water shares restricted
to canal company service areas

↑
Ways
water
security
could be
increased

- “Yeah, see my water can only be rented inside the service area of Cub River. But with a water bank, potentially I could be renting my
water to Willard Bay.”

-

Access to water for ecosystem needs

- “If the bank is developed in a way that is fair for all potential users to be able to lease water, then it is possible to use water for
instream purposes.”

-

Incentivize arrangements to move water between
communities and uses

- “I guess to me the benefit is that we are able to move water around, those who have a lot of water to those who don’t have a lot of
water. I think that is the major purpose of creating a bank - to do exactly that.”

-

Potential expansion of irrigated agriculture within
watershed

- “It would definitely give us the ability, at least initially before people catch onto it, you could go acquire dry farmland and have water
for it. Because that is a lot cheaper ground simply because it doesn’t have water.”

State/Region
A way to minimize “buy and dry” scenarios

- “The number one thing I think it can fix is the buy and dry, the idea of water getting bought up for development and that’s the end.”

An approach to move water to its “highest and
best use” in the state

- “I think the big one is allowing water to be put to its highest and best use and letting the market work.”

Individual
- Hydrologic/ecosystem impairment from water
bank-facilitated infrastructure modifications

Watershed-Community

↓

- “If I can jump in and jump out based upon a given set of circumstances in any given year, I like the concept. The details are where it
gets a little difficult, but I like the concept.”

Watershed-Community

-

Ways
water
security
could be
decreased

Example stakeholder comments

-

Impairment risk to multiple interests due to
transfers from lower to upper watershed reaches

-

Flow system alteration may force junior rights
holders to purchase water

-

Water bank “crowding” could reduce overall
water security in a watershed

- “Because when you start putting anything in pipes, then what has been percolating down through the aquifer and showing up in the
springs down below suddenly starts to change. So that is going to be a challenge for the water bank.”
- “I think that anything that is going to significantly disrupt the flow regime of the Bear River into the Great Salt Lake is problematic.
That is a function of either diminished flows and/or timing, which are really important for the ecology.”
- “The junior appropriators downstream from you that used to use that water when you didn’t, that is being taken down and given to
someone else and they are pushed to the side.”
- “If banks are managed in a fragmented manner, where there are just a bunch of small ones around, I think that might end up causing
some problems… we might miss out on what the broader impact or benefit might be... I guess my other concern is conflict among
water banks… if there is not some oversight or coordination.”

State/Region

-

Paradox of water banks stimulating greater
consumptive use and reducing water availability
for ecosystem services

- “The return flows getting back to Bear River Canal Company are fewer and fewer, so our dependence on Bear Lake becomes greater
and greater as these other irrigation companies become more efficient."

-

Water banking will be limited to only those who
can afford to participate

- “I worry about the big money, whatever the source is, dominating that market.”
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Table 3.4 Themes in stakeholder responses regarding potential water banking influences on the security provided by water rights.
Scale and water banking influence
Individual

↑
Ways
water
security
could be
increased

Example stakeholder comments

- Offers water rights protection and institutionalized
market-based incentives for individuals to engage
in water leasing
- Affords protection for non-use of water rights and
flexibility for uses in transition

- “… because now you are compensating someone for a property right that they have, you are protecting that property right just through
an institution, and then creating a market where those that do not have can then purchase and get what they require. So, you are
meeting a need, protecting rights, and creating an incentive.”

- Provides access to junior water right holders or
other uses needing water

- “It is good for irrigators in particular. Then communities or farmers who have a lower priority water right can get some of that water.”

Watershed-Community

-

Water banking could maximize beneficial use of
water and hence protect water rights for future use

- “Water banks can help water rights holders as a region transitions from agriculture to urban, [providing] a safe haven for the water
right to avoid forfeiture while the holder decides future planning.”

- “If we set a precedence of efficiency, we are less likely to have other people come and take it… But if we are moving it around and
putting it places where we can use it, we are using it. There is nothing here for you to come get, because we are using it all. We have
re-allocated it and it has moved to better places…”

State/Region

-

Incentivize the agricultural community to seek
more efficient practices, making available
conserved water to lease

Individual
- Losing control over water rights if bank is
mismanaged or lessees (e.g., cities) become
reliant on water source
- Limited bank applicability if actors only place low
priority water rights in the bank

Watershed-Community

Ways
water
security
could be
decreased

↓

-

Diversity in water rights/shares will complicate
water bank administration and impact watershed
hydrology

-

Resurrection of dormant rights could alter existing
allocation system and strain water bank
administration

State/Region
Complications in water rights administration at
the state level

-

Water banks in unadjudicated areas will operate
sub-optimally

-

Risk of local intensification of water consumption
without adequate water bank governance

- “People say, well we are willing to share it or lease it. But we are not sure we will get it back when we need it, or have access to it
when we need it. So that is I think where the resistance comes, from what I think I understand about water banking."
- “So, my biggest concern with a water bank is printing funny money and nobody puts their good water rights in the bank.”

- “But what a water share is on the east side of the valley versus the north end of the valley versus the south end versus the west, every
company is different… because I would dare say if you had water shares in a system anywhere in the valley, you wouldn’t necessarily
know the volume that represents.”
- “I think it is a bit messy. I know there are some people that haven’t used their water for a long, long time. And the state is getting more
aggressive that if you are not using it, we are taking it away. And those people just throw it all into a bank and it would be
protected?”
- “There is not only priority and the water itself, but there is the timing and then there are the type of rights, flow or storage, or the best
right which is a combination right. So, when we want to put everything into a lease pool of some kind, you have to realize that you are
not comparing a bushel of apples. This is a fruit basket…”
- “The challenge that we have with the State of Utah is we have not even adjudicated all of the water, so we haven’t really defined where
the water is and who has it... [so] how can you put it in a bank and lease it out?
- “There is risk of enlargement of water rights if water bank exchanges are not properly managed, in effect causing greater depletion
and insecurity in terms of supply... The other thing is the violation of water law and the fact that that is acreage expansion.”
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-

- “Water banking can offer them a really good incentive to only use the water needed to grow that crop and then, through that water
bank, that water can be leased to some other user in a different area to give them an incentive to save that water.”

Table 3.5 Themes in stakeholder responses regarding potential water banking influences on water security through governance.
Scale and water banking influence
Individual

↑
Ways
water
security
could be
increased

Example stakeholder comments

- More structured, contract-based agreements in
lieu of “handshake deals”
- Expedites the approval process for temporary
transfers
- Ability to move larger blocks of water

- “But what mechanism is there for them to really guarantee that they are going to get that water in the fall? And if they could work
through a bank, then they would have a greater chance.”

- Allows for experimental design in local water
banks to meet different needs

- “So, we are envisioning it very much like a republican democracy, where we have these little laboratories for each bank to see what
works. People could come up with something that we didn’t even think about.”

Watershed-Community

- “I think this comes back to the concept of the spot market. You really want to have flexibility in the bank to be like - I need water this
season.”
- “Scalability of water banks as opposed to one-on-one transactions for seeking instream flows… a lot easier.”

-

Water banking could reduce need or delay large
infrastructure projects

- “I think it potentially buys us a substantial amount of time… between conservation efforts and water banking and some of these other
things, we can put off major expensive construction… and do some quality planning.”

-

Opportunity for multiple benefits from a single
water bank transaction

- “If you could have double uses on the same tranche of water, that would be very exciting. I think that would make our resources go so
much further than they currently are.”

-

Water bank could be a central repository for water
to enhance decision-making

- “But that enables much more freedom of decision making about “Do I really need to use my water this year? Or maybe I want to lease
that to somebody else or I might want to leave it in the stream for that period of time.”

State/Region

-

A way to cultivate coordination and community in
water governance

- “I think it will incentivize these different water interests in a given region and maybe find a way to work together and to build
relationships that they otherwise wouldn’t do… the more we can get people talking and working together with a common purpose, it is
going to reduce the need for litigation…we are seeing that.”

Individual
- Concern amongst farmers of societal expectations
to self-fund irrigation efficiency improvements

Ways
water
security
could be
decreased

↓

- “Those of us in agriculture would be more than happy to do that. But it costs money. And sometimes the feasibility of that, even though
we like the idea, we can’t do it because we just plain can’t afford it.”

Watershed-Community

-

Bias in local water bank governance could
heighten equity concerns

-

Service area design of water banks could hinder
access

- “One of the things that we would like to overcome with water banks is local bias. You know, so-and-so won’t sell to so-and-so and will
give them a short shrift. I worry with locally chartered banks we’re not resolving that.”
- “The challenge is coming up with a service area that works, because that is the whole concept, is that you have a service area that you
define that theoretically will pass kosher so you can change a water right into it.”

State/Region

-

Complexity in institutional design could limit
participation

- “It is going to become really complex really fast. Because those who are pushing this don’t realize the levels of complexity of actually
physically getting the water from point A to point B… Theoretically it could happen. I could see that it could happen, but I don’t know
how it would be in practice.”

-

Challenges and conflicts in crafting the decision
rules for valuing water and the beneficial nature of
its uses

- “It does provide a mechanism by which lower water values, priority values, can be transferred to higher priority values. I think there
are some opportunities there. The problem with it is the definition of higher values versus lower values. They tend, when you talk
about banks, to be economic. And that’s what scares me.”
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improving water security by keeping beneficial use of water rights local (watershedcommunity scale in upper half of Table 3.4), thus rendering them less accessible to
interests beyond the watershed-community (i.e., preventing transfers for urban needs
along the Wasatch Front). At the individual scale, the exemption of banked water rights
from forfeiture and abandonment provisions of prior appropriation law was welcomed by
those who saw benefit in the legal protection of their rights with the simultaneous
potential for financial gain through leasing of those rights through a water bank.
Complimenting this protection, participants from various sectors recognized the mutual
benefits from water bank transactions in terms of short-term access to water rights for the
lessee and financial gain for lessor. Thus, the benefits of forfeiture protection for water
rights, potential access to additional water, and financial compensation from leased rights
represent three influences that could presumably improve various individuals’ water
security. However, as shown in the lower half of Table 3.3, individual gains made
through water banking could come at the expense of diminished water quantities flowing
through the system and, hence, could simultaneously reduce water security at the
watershed-community scale. Such conditions could create greater insecurity for other
interests in the watershed, especially in a hydro-social system with highly interconnected
agricultural uses that depend on return flows to satisfy users with different priority dates.
Moreover, water banking’s potential influence on protecting water in Cache Valley could
reduce critical flows that support the Great Salt Lake and adjacent wetlands downstream.
As a second example of water banking’s offsetting influences across hydro-social
scales, Utah’s water banking bill intends to promote “low-cost water transactions between
users” through market processes. Yet, water banks facilitating transfers of water to its
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“highest and best use” was a beneficial water security influence identified by some
participants for increasing water security at a state-wide scale. Simple market principles
of scarcity and price dictate that costs for water will increase in times of high demand
unless water banks have fixed prices as done in Idaho’s water bank system. The stateregional scale influence in the lower half of Table 3.3 exemplifies the concern of several
interviewees that only urban areas and larger commercial buyers who can afford to pay
for water will participate, negating needs for greater equity in water access through water
banking to meet societal objectives articulated in the Water Banking Act (Table 3.1).
These inter-scale tradeoffs in outcomes would further suggest that water security could
only be improved for those individuals who hold water rights or entities who can pay for
access, a concern articulated as follows by one participant:
That could be good, unless it is benefitting solely limited private interests
at the expense of the larger social group. And that is what banks tend to
do. Those with the deep pockets can buy the rights and those without the
deep pockets, be it environmental groups, social groups, ag people, do not
have the opportunity to compete for that water, because the deep pocket
developers will out bid them.
A third example involves contrasting anticipations of water banking’s influence
on infrastructure development. Stakeholders expressed differing opinions about how
water banking might affect controversial dam projects intended to develop and distribute
additional water supplies. The view offered by a wide range of stakeholders revealed
their hope that using water banks to reallocate existing supplies could perhaps offset the
immediate need for large infrastructure projects in Utah (watershed-community scale in
Table 3.5). Counterintuitively, the Bear River Development Project slated for northern
Utah has been under active planning since 1991 when Utah’s state legislative action
apportioned undeveloped water allocated to Utah through the Bear River Compact with
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Idaho and Wyoming (Utah Division of Water Resources 2020), that includes Cache
County. Several participants who supported water banking anticipated that the project
would enable Cache Valley interests to store their apportioned share not for their own use
but to market other places. Additionally, various stakeholders commented on the critical
need for surface reservoirs and aquifer storage to actually allow water banks to work, as
several participants were unclear how they could function without storage. The following
passage from a Utah state agency representative illustrates this reasoning:
I think to have a water bank you actually have to have physical structures
of actual water. You can’t just play a shell game. You need to probably
have reservoirs where I am a farmer, whatever my water I am not using
has to be able to be stored somewhere so it can be leased to someone else.
The data presented in Tables 3.3-3.5 reveal not only the potential individualized
gains or losses in water security through water banks, but also several larger, interrelated,
and inter-scale tradeoffs in potential outcomes. Because of northern Utah’s unique,
closed-system hydrology and the protective policy against quantity impairment in Utah’s
water code (Utah Code 73-3-8), the actual physical transfer of water through water
banking activities will undoubtedly result in physical impacts to the hydrologic system.
To what degree these impacts actually “impair” or “injure” water users and ecosystems is
unclear. Table 3.6 displays three scale-based hydrologic outcomes that could result from
water banking, to which the increase in water security at one scale could both increase
and decrease water security at other scales. For instance, as indicated by the effects of the
first anticipated outcome in Table 3.6, the expansion of agriculture in one area of the
Bear River Watershed is likely to improve water security for certain groups of
individuals, but actually risk the intensification of consumptive use, resulting in less
water available for some of Utah’s most pressing ecosystem needs. At the state level, this

Table 3.6 Potential tradeoffs to water security at different scales with anticipated outcomes of
implementing water banks in Utah. Plus signs (+) indicate a potential scale-related increase in
water security, minus signs (-) refer to potential scale-related decrease in water security.
ANTICIPATED
OUTCOMES
Water banks
stimulating greater
consumptive use in
watersheds – i.e.
expansion of irrigated
agriculture in Cache
Valley (upstream of
critical aquatic
ecosystems)

Individual

SCALE EFFECTS
Watershed-Community

(+)
(Opportunity for access to water
for individual pursuits in water
bank service area (i.e.
agriculture, industry,
recreation))

(-)
(Increased consumptive use
upstream of critical stream
reaches, wetlands, or lakes will
reduce available water for nonconsumptive purposes)

State
(+)
(Supports state objective of full
utilization of its water resources
and “robust and sustainable
agricultural production”)
(-)
(Will limit the capacity of water
moving more freely between
competing interests if use is
focused in specific sectors, as
described in the RSWS)
(-)
(Will limit meeting water
banking bill’s objective of a
“healthy and resilient natural
environment”)
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ANTICIPATED
OUTCOMES
Natural flow right
transfers through
water banks to
diversion and
consumptive uses
upstream or
downstream of the
original location of use
associated with the
water right

Water banks
stimulating more
canal company water
rights devoted to
leases outside of
service areas

Individual

SCALE EFFECTS
Watershed-Community

(+)
(Improves short-term water
security for individual user
leasing water and lessor
receiving financial
compensation)

(-)
(If transfer is from lower to
upper reaches of a stream, less
water remains flowing through
channel, impacting ecosystem
needs and other individual users)

(-)
(Potential influence on
availability of water for junior
water rights, could result in
lower priority entitlement
holders seeking to fulfill their
needs through water bank
rentals (water they once received
for free))

(-)
(If transfer is from upper to
lower stream reaches, water
remains in channel and alters
pattern of return flows
originating in upstream reaches,
affecting natural features and
irrigators above the new
diversion point)

(+)
(Canal companies (as an
individual entity) can gain
financially from transactions
through water banks)

(+)
(Portion of canal company rights
available for other sectors in the
watershed, including instream
flows)

(-)
(Individual canal company
members near ends of ditches
could experience diminished
water security due to less water
in conveyance system)

(-)
(Release of water normally
diverted to canal company
service area used upstream or
downstream will alter return
flow patterns in the system and
junior users in the watershed)

State
(+)
(Supports state objective of full
utilization of its water resources
and “robust and sustainable
agricultural production”)
(-)
(Will limit meeting water
banking bill’s objective of a
“healthy and resilient natural
environment”)

(+)
(Supports state objective of full
utilization of its water resources
and water banking bill’s
objective of facilitating “robust
and sustainable agriculture
production while meeting
growing municipal and
industrial demands”)
(+)
(Potential to help water banking
bill’s objective of a “healthy and
resilient natural environment”)
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would create a situation of paradoxical outcomes. Water banking could help fulfill the
state’s full utilization objective, but counterintuitively stymy two key objectives of water
banks: facilitating transfers between agriculture and other sectors and promoting “a
healthy and resilient natural environment” (2020 Utah Senate Bill 26). Similar situations
could arise in which changing a water right’s period of use and point of diversion would
have beneficial impacts for those directly involved in water banking transactions and
meet state goals of facilitating movement of water, while simultaneously risking
impairment to other users or natural features that, for example, became dependent on
spring flows originating from decades of canal seepage.
The potential increase or decrease in water security and inter-scalar effects that
could emerge with water banking are conditioned on how the banking entities are
designed and governed. This explains why, among the caveats and explanations offered
for whether participants thought water banks could improve water security, issues of
governance emerged as the third major theme. Table 3.5 illustrates that stakeholders
believe water banks can increase water security in a number of ways, particularly if they
help people coordinate use of water and pool larger blocks for reallocation. But
participants also acknowledge how water banks can reduce water security if they are not
strategically designed to include values other than price in their decision making and
operate in ways that serve goals other than just brokering water.
Fairness in Promoting Water Security
After discussing with participants the meaning of water security and whether it
can be improved by water banking, we asked them what they thought would be the fairest
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way for Utah to promote water security in light of anticipated future tradeoffs. Coded
responses to this question are presented in Figure 3.2.
The top two categories of responses relate to government measures and market
principles. These represent the two major water allocation mechanisms that Utah’s water
banking act seeks to balance in ways that people see as fair. Water banking involves the
application of market-based incentives under the existing government legal system of
water allocation through prior appropriation. The facts that these two responses were
most prevalent, but that people cited government

Figure 3.2 Categorized responses to the interview question regarding fairness in policies
that promote water security.
measures more often than market principles, aligns with people’s concerns about
ensuring that water banking exchanges should not just involve water rights and financial
currency, but also the need to incorporate other values recognized through government
measures to promote water uses beneficial to society. Responses categorized as “social-
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behavioral change” showed recognition that addressing issues of fairness in promoting
water security involves managing basic human behavior, which government measures
and market principles can be designed to do. Having inclusive dialogue and using
science-based decision support were seen by some people as necessary to fairly promote
water security. Interestingly, reliance on local management and control was mentioned
least often as the fairest way to promote water security. In light of the other results
presented in this section, this can be interpreted as additional support for the need to deal
with the complexity of influences across hydro-social scales and to fully assess and
account for whose water security is being strengthened or diminished.
Conclusions
Our study contributes to the evolving discourse and application of the water
security concept by examining its meaning through the perspective of stakeholders in a
hydro-social setting representative of the U.S. Intermountain West. We assessed
stakeholder views regarding how they thought reallocation through water banking will
influence water security in a prior appropriation-based allocation system. Participants’
primary interpretations of water security focused on availability and reliability of access
to established quantities of water that are provided through state-administered water
rights and afforded legal protections. The emphasis on water rights as a water security
pathway recognizes the historical trajectory of harnessing hydrology in an arid region of
a high-income national setting. This history resulted in, from a societal perspective,
“sustained development of human capabilities and wellbeing,” a key water security
outcome identified in the relational water security framework (Jepson et al. 2017a). The
water security interpretations drawn from this research reflect how water rights,
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considered pillars of water security by various stakeholders, can now become water bank
currency as Utah begins to facilitate water reallocation through a legislatively enacted
water banking program. Moreover, with prior appropriation’s prevalence throughout the
U.S. West, similar perspectives of water rights undergirding individual water security
could be expected among holders of senior water rights in other watersheds in the region.
Framing Utah’s accumulating interest in water banking within Gerlak et al.’s
(2018) characterization of water security illustrates the multifaceted nature of reallocation
governance in the U.S. West. First, increasing Utah’s water security through water
banking legislation is a policy objective. Water banks are intended to provide access to
water through leasing of rights for traditional uses as well as underserved and new
interests. However, in attempting to fulfill the objectives in Table 3.1, Utah policymakers
recognized that the hydrologic uniqueness in the state’s watersheds would require
flexibility in water bank design to address locally unique circumstances and policy
objectives. While this approach aligns with dialogue in the literature on multi-level and
adaptive water governance (Bakker and Morinville 2013; Varady et al. 2016), the risk of
tradeoffs or potential conflict remain. While Utah’s Water Banking Act included state
oversight provisions, it does not define how water banks are to be designed. This intricate
process is left to the local interests seeking to establish water banks. This decentralized
approach to water banking thus ties closely with Gerlak et al’s (2018) second water
security concept – the notion of water banks as a framework for decision making.
This research revealed multiple ways in which reallocation through water banking
can impact water security at different scales. Water bank establishment creates several
decision points for both water bank administrators and participants alike. For
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administrators, the rules that determine who can participate and how water rights are
exchanged are key questions that can influence water security at the individual,
watershed-community, and regional scales. Water banks can also afford individuals and
groups a broader set of choices and decision points in how they exercise their water
rights. While Utah policymakers are banking on the notion of economic-based incentives
catalyzing water transfers in the state, they also established a law in the 2020 legislative
session enabling the formation watershed councils. Their purpose is to establish forums
of diverse stakeholders to “facilitate discussion of and collaboration on local watershed
issues” (2020 Utah House Bill 166). While these two bills may seem contradictory,
several stakeholders revealed that water banks could lead to uniting the water community
if their establishment treats water as a shared resource.
Stakeholder-identified tradeoffs likely to emerge from reallocation illustrate
another critical issue that must be accounted for in the water bank design process. Our
data revealed a strong sense of connection within the agricultural community and a desire
to not only gain individually from water banking but help expand irrigated agriculture in
northern Utah. Water banks in some locations have been created as an alternative water
reallocation method to buy-and-dry to facilitate ag-to-urban transfers (Lepper, 2006;
Dilling et al. 2019). However, our case study shows that water banks could work as a tool
to keep water within a local agricultural community if banks prohibit transfers beyond the
watershed-community scale. Although such a model would help engender irrigators’ trust
with the water bank, the potential exclusion of certain interests, such as those seeking
aquatic ecosystem protections, would limit a water bank’s capacity to meet the state’s
water banking objectives. The data in tables 3.3-3.6 demonstrate that scalar-based
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tradeoffs are likely unavoidable when considering the water security outcomes of water
banking in the northern Utah context. This is a result of hydrologic realities and
institutional artifacts of approaching reallocation with two fundamentally different
policies in prior appropriation and market incentives. We contend that enabling these
contrasting policies to work in tandem is not implausible however, as water rights under
the prior appropriation doctrine exist within the hydro-social cycle of a community of
water right holders. If water security is prioritized in an inclusive decision-making
framework, water banks can be designed to build on existing societal connections to
water that also include emerging societal needs.
Legal and governance safeguards are imperative in water reallocation schemes
(Garrick et al. 2018). While one in four participants saw the market as the fairest way to
promote Utah’s water security, a greater number believed government policy would more
fairly address water security tradeoffs (Figure 3.2). Institutional governance is thus
critical to ensure water banks are not merely reallocating water security between
interests. While water banking is a relatively simple policy concept, our analysis shows
that complexities in its implementation emerge when local contexts are examined. This is
due to in part to coinciding issues such as differing individual and collective priorities,
infrastructure challenges, and the value of goods and services (economic or social)
provided through the beneficial use of water.
Finally, water banks can provide measurable data to assess the state of water
security in different settings. In areas where banks are active, it is likely that individual or
collective interests are seeking to bolster their water security. Another critical metric is
understanding what sectors water is moving between and at what price. For example, data
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on the movement of water to key ecosystem service needs can inform policymakers as to
whether a voluntary market mechanism can, over time, serve as an effective policy tool in
maintaining the Great Salt Lake or other terminal lake ecosystems in the U.S. West.
Our research demonstrates that water bank design and governance requires a
commitment from state and local leadership to strong legal protections and oversight to
mitigate for the likely tradeoffs that can ensue at different scales. Moreover, leaders must
understand the adherence stakeholders across multiple sectors have towards water rights
as their predominate pathway to water security. This is likely a universal perspective that
must be considered in planning and devising reallocation schemes in states across the
U.S. West that also adhere to prior appropriation water law. Whether the allocation
approach is proportional, such as in Australia’s water entitlement system, or temporalbased seniority with prior appropriation in the US. West (Hanemann and Young 2020),
assessing stakeholder perspectives can enhance reallocation policy. The lessons from this
research are critical to institutional design considerations of water banks and are
prerequisite for building capacity to fairly and effectively contribute to alleviating
individual and collective water insecurities.
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CHAPTER IV
THROUGH THE EYES OF STAKEHOLDERS: USING SOCIAL DATA TO ASSESS
DETERENTS AND PATHWAYS TO WATER BANKING IN UTAH, USA1
Abstract
Implementation of market-based water reallocation schemes often face multiple
institutional and social obstacles. Approaches to more flexibly reallocate water for
competing needs require policy reforms that overcome hindrances in institutional
arrangements and individual behaviors. We used socially based qualitative research to
examine the reciprocating influence between existing institutions and stakeholder
perceptions and behaviors in the U.S. state of Utah, where water banking as a reallocation
policy was introduced in 2020. Through key-informant interviews and focus groups, we
found that stakeholders questioned the need for water banks and expressed notions of risk
aversion, protectionism, and hesitancy towards water right transfers. Water bank designs
must also account for prevailing agricultural practices, resistance to water use metering,
and informalities within irrigation companies. We attribute these findings to path
dependencies rooted in allocation institutions, the legacy of conveyance infrastructure
designs, and individual circumstances regarding water use needs and practices. This
research highlights how path dependencies can influence individual perceptions of
market-based reallocation schemes. We argue that understanding these linkages is critical
to designing new policy pathways, and that user perceptions explain in part why water
markets have been less universally accepted in the western U.S. than economists have
anticipated.
1
Co-Authors: Lisa Welsh and Joanna Endter-Wada. Formatted to the specifications of the Journal
of the American Water Resources Association.
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Introduction
For decades, water markets have been promoted as a policy response to global
water scarcity (Howe, 1986; Easter et al., 1999; Bjornlund, 2003; Glennon, 2005).
Economic and legal scholars have championed their use as a hedge against climate
change impacts, population growth, ecosystem impairment, and inter-sectoral disparities
in access to water (Garrick et al., 2009; Culp et al., 2014; Rosegrant et al., 2014). Water
markets are intended to financially incentivize the reallocation of water from low
economic value applications such as forage crop irrigation to uses yielding higher
economic returns (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994). Market-based water reallocation
can occur through permanent transfers of water rights or leases of water for various
durations within and across economic sectors (Brewer et al., 2007). Despite theoretically
idealized societal benefits, a wealth of research has examined inherent limitations to
water markets, with transaction costs commonly cited as a principal hinderance to their
broader application (Hadjigeorgalis, 2009; Grafton et al., 2012; Breviglieri et al., 2018;
Endo et al., 2018).
North (1990: 362) defined transaction costs as “the costs of measuring and
enforcing agreements.” In water markets, these costs can derive from the need for
institutional changes, additional information acquisition, water infrastructure upgrades,
and enforcement, monitoring, and mitigation of third-party impacts caused by water
transfers (Marston and Cai, 2016). In the western United States (U.S.), transaction costs
are, in part, driven by attributes of the prevailing water allocation system (i.e., prior
appropriation law). Water rights under prior appropriation are usufructuary in nature and
priority in access is based on when diversion from a water source for a beneficial use first
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occurred (Kundis Craig et al., 2017). While water right transfers in the western U.S. are
guided by individual state laws, a ubiquitous aspect of the water transfer process in all
western U.S. states is the “no harm” rule that protects other users from hydrologic effects
of transfers. Pre-transfer evaluations for non-impairment can result in expenses that
render market participation cost prohibitive (Hanemann and Young, 2020).
In explaining human adaptation to social and natural environments, Schmid
(2004: 264) argues that “individuals affect institutions and institutions affect the
preferences and cognitions of individuals.” While the term institution has several
meanings, we refer to the basic concept of ordered relationships (both formal and
informal) that define rights, privileges, and responsibilities among individuals (Schmid,
2004), or as North (1990: 3) offers, “the rules of the game in a society.” Coincident with
transaction costs, certain social dimensions (i.e., beliefs, norms, actions) within
institutions and at the individual level play a consequential role in the establishment of
market-based water reallocation schemes. In addition to state laws, rules governing local
irrigation entities can limit water market activity (Ghimire and Griffin, 2014; Aylward et
al., 2016). Moreover, apprehension towards water markets can be deeply rooted due to
negative outcomes of market exchanges and fear of state or private interests interfering
with the existing allocation system (Marston and Cai, 2016). In the western U.S.,
potential impacts in areas-of-origin have limited proposed water transfers, such as in
California’s Central Valley (Hanak, 2005), southeastern Nevada (Welsh and EndterWada, 2017), and southern Colorado (Bowlin, 2019). Furthermore, culturally based
views that reject the commodification of water persist in many societies globally
(Bjornlund and McKay, 2002; Ingram et al., 2008).

121
As existing rules underpinning current water allocation law (i.e., prior
appropriation) collide with the reality of water scarcity in the western U.S., the
paramount questions facing the water governance community is how will transformation
of long-established institutions controlling water allocation occur, and will it support
sustainable use of limited water supplies and more flexible and equitable approaches to
water allocation? Overcoming historically rooted circumstances of how water is allocated
will require investments in institutional reform that include broader stakeholder
engagement (Garrick, 2015; Marston and Cai, 2016). Understanding how existing
institutions and proposed reallocation measures can influence as well as be influenced by
decisions at the individual level is vital in the policy design process, particularly for those
policies in which behavioral changes are a key component of meeting collectively
defined objectives.
This research utilized qualitative social science research to examine how specific
social dimensions (individual behaviors, attitudes, outlooks) in a water user community
are shaped by established water allocation institutions, and how these dimensions may
influence user interest and participation in water reallocation schemes. This examination
relies on key informant insights regarding the potential implementation of water banks in
a fully appropriated watershed in the western U.S. state of Utah. Water banks are
institutional arrangements that rely on market-based exchanges to incentivize temporary
water right transfers (Clifford et al., 2004). They facilitate water right transfers through
entities that centralize the administrative process as compared to privately sought,
bilateral water market transactions (MacDonnell et al., 1994). The study area selected for
this research is representative of many western U.S. watersheds that face multiple
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coinciding water management dilemmas. Our work centers on understanding: 1) how
social dimensions among agricultural producers are shaped by existing water allocation
institutions; 2) how individual choices in water use practices may create or limit
opportunities to participate in water banking, and 3) how these interconnections between
institutions and individuals are attributed to path dependencies rooted in the historic
development of water allocation law and infrastructure in the western U.S. Understanding
these path dependent interconnections is central to informing water reallocation policy
designs that are reliant on user participation to meet policy objectives.
Through social science and policy analysis data, our findings contribute insights
on water reallocation by illustrating an alternative or supplemental perspective to
“economic transaction costs” on why market-based water transfer schemes in the western
United States have been limited in practice. This research compliments economics-based
assessments of water markets by examining how fundamental social attributes of water
users create obstacles to water reallocation reforms. We argue that the allocation system
in the western U.S. that provided water for the needs of generations of users historically
has also led to path dependent practices at the individual and institutional levels. Over
time, these social practices have created a culture of apprehension among key groups of
water users that hinder opportunities for water reallocation reform. We use a narrative
presentation in the results and discussion section that interweaves participant insights
with interpretive analysis to address the overarching questions of this research. This
approach is well suited for presenting contextually based qualitative textual data that
describe stakeholder thoughts, opinions, observations, histories, and actions.
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Perspectives on Institutions and Individuals
The following subsections provide a brief literature overview on the background
constructs used to frame this research. Discussion on the role of institutions in water
reallocation reform is first presented, followed by an overview of literature highlighting
stakeholder perceptions of water reallocation. The final section highlights elements of the
path dependency concept within institutions and at the individual level.
Institutional Elements of Water Reallocation
Meinzen-Dick and Ringler (2008) identified three principal pathways to water
reallocation: administrative, market-based, and collective negotiations. The suitability of
each approach depends on various social, economic, and political factors and, in practice,
water reallocation often involves a combination of these measures. Water markets, in
economic theory, facilitate the transfer of water to its “highest and best use” and are often
regarded as efficiency-seeking alternatives to administrative rulings (Chong and Sunding,
2006; Hadjigeorgalis, 2009). Formal markets for water are considered most appropriate
where mature institutional arrangements exist, such as well-defined property rights and
administrative capacities (Easter et al., 1999; Young, 2015). Determining the
applicability of water markets can require substantial investments. Wheeler et al.’s (2017)
framework for assessing water market “readiness” defined a process for evaluating water
market “enablers” that include the state of existing institutions (property right
arrangements, governance capacities), social drivers (why reallocation is needed), and
hydrologic features (watershed connectivity, monitoring, available data). These
preconditions do not guarantee optimal economic or social outcomes of water markets,
however. Breviglieri et al. stressed that “there is a significant difference between the idea
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of markets as proposed by economic theory and practice in the water sector,” (2018, p.
1087) and that water markets must evolve from “purely an economic mechanism” to
institutions that are “embedded in the socio-political context” of their place of use (2018:
1087). Marston and Cai’s holistic framework for guiding reallocation decision-making
stresses the use of social data to address water reallocation barriers, which include “a lack
of information support and limited stakeholder involvement” (2016: 672). The authors
stress the use of social data to elevate transparency and “clarify stakeholders’ values and
beliefs” (2016: 672). While reliant on market elements, water banks can be
administratively structured to account for broader social and political considerations
through their institutional design and responsiveness to individual or societal needs.
Institutional Reform and the Stakeholder
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2015, p.
35) defines “stakeholder” as a “person, group, or organization who has an interest or
stake in a water-related topic, may be directly or indirectly affected by water policy,
and/or have the ability to influence the outcome positively or negatively.” Stakeholder
perspectives on the marketization of water are hence crucial to informing reallocation
policy designs, as key actors (those who hold water rights and those willing to pay for
water access) are integral to market exchanges taking place (Easter et al., 1998; Marston
and Cai, 2016). In this study, we defined stakeholders as people or entities directly
connected to water through its application towards a beneficial use or involved in its
governance though legislative, regulatory, legal, or non-governmental connections. To
avoid redundancy, we also interchange the terms “participants” or “interviewees” for
stakeholders in this article’s Findings and Discussion section. In settings where market-
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based reallocation has been pursued, stakeholder research often followed. Reluctance
among water right holders to take part in new water market schemes has been
documented (Tisdell and Ward, 2003; Giannoccaro, 2013), but gradual acceptance and
increased participation has also been observed over time (Grafton et al., 2016).
Furthermore, conflicting views on water as a tradable commodity versus its necessity as a
vital resource that is connected to the land on which it is applied have been noted in
multiple countries (Bauer, 1997; Tisdell and Ward, 2003).
In the western U.S., Keenan et al.’s (1999) survey of agricultural and residential
water users in western Colorado and California’s Kern County found contrasting views of
water markets. Colorado participants in agriculture were generally less positive and saw
markets as a threat to their water rights. California respondents, who tended to be
absentee owners of large agricultural enterprises, were generally in favor of their use.
Following an unsuccessful pilot water bank program in Colorado’s Arkansas River
Valley, Lepper and Freeman (2010) found that stakeholders lacked trust in the state at the
project’s onset, and that ambiguous participation rules, limited local control, and the
perceived threat to senior water rights hampered interest. In Nevada’s Walker Lake
Basin, Singletary and Narayanan’s (2003) survey of interest in water banking among
water rights holders found that about half of the respondents were willing to participate if
they had direct involvement in the water bank’s design and if water rights had forfeiture
protection. Those not willing to participate opposed non-agricultural water use and
harbored mistrust towards the federal government. Although a water bank was not
pursued, Hockaday (2020) found that of the reallocation measures eventually
implemented, senior water rights holders favored temporary transactions over a local
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conservancy group’s water rights acquisition program focused on permanent transfers. In
an assessment of water conservation barriers in Colorado River Basin agriculture, Taylor
et al. (2019) concluded that in complex watersheds, “every ditch is indeed different,” and
that the diversity in allocation challenges across the basin necessitate local innovations.
Multiple Forms of Path Dependency
The path dependency concept refers to “developmental trajectories that are
inherently difficult to reverse” (Hacker, 2002, p. 54) and stresses the importance of past
choices and events shaping and potentially limiting possible future options and outcomes
(Sewell, 1996). The path dependency perspective offers a lens to understand the
interactions and feedbacks of institutional and individual choices and the resulting
impediments to adaptive policies such as water banks. When positive feedbacks ensue
from an existing trajectory, reversal or altering courses over time becomes increasingly
more costly (North, 2006). Understanding institutional change (i.e., reversing path
dependency) has been the focus of different research perspectives on institutionalism. In
assuming stability in the social and political environment, rational choice institutionalism
has centered on the individual and views institutions as “coordinating mechanisms”
structured to maximize personal gain (Thelen, 1999). Historical and sociological
institutionalism framings see institutions as the legacy of concrete historical processes”
that continue to face ongoing “contestation” over time (Thelen and Conran, 2016, p. 11).
These perspectives contribute to understanding the path dependency concept with
emphasis on how institutional arrangements impact human behavior and the subsequent
outcomes over time. While assumptions of institutional stability are foundational in each
of these perspectives, pathways to reform have been debated between incremental
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adjustments or punctuated system “shocks” (Thelen and Conran, 2016). In an alternative
perspective on institutional reform, Campbell (2010: 98) suggested that existing
institutions should be viewed as resources rather than constraints, noting that institutional
rearrangements can occur in “new and creative ways.”
Path dependency within institutions influences how past decisions and actions
constrain present-day options facing an individual or organization. Over time the benefits
of the current path become increasingly more attractive or self-reinforcing relative to the
costs of systematic change (Pierson, 2000). With an emphasis on how history connects to
the present day, Garrick (2015: 79) notes that “path dependency underscores the role of
time and the dynamic interplay of stability and change.” Water institutions in the western
U.S. based on prior appropriation and rooted in hydrologic and societal circumstances of
the 19th and early 20th Centuries have created dilemmas in addressing the water needs of
the 21st Century (Heinmiller, 2009; Libecap, 2011; Dettinger et al., 2015). Historically,
prior appropriation created a status quo favoring senior water rights holders who put
water to the historically predominant uses in agriculture and mining. Moreover, path
dependency is reinforced by past infrastructure projects that have since limited the
potential options to mitigate contemporary dilemmas such as the health of aquatic
ecosystems and anadromous fish species (Leonard et al., 2015; Schmidt et al., 2016;
Wheeler et al., 2021). While outcomes of past policy decisions are often cost prohibitive
to reverse entirely, reforms that adapt to changing circumstances can incrementally alter
existing institutions. Hence, diagnosis of past choices is imperative to reforms that
modify yet still function within existing allocation institutions (Garrick, 2015).
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Path dependency in individual behavior has received considerably less attention in
the literature than in the concept’s application at the institutional level (Roedenbeck,
2011). Barnes et al. described behavioral “lock-in” as a condition when the individual
actor is “stuck” in an “inefficiency or sub-optimality due to habit, organizational learning,
or culture” (2004: 372). They further identified institutional pressure, hesitancy to
relinquish power and control, and status quo “inertia” as keys to locking in behavioral
attitudes and practices of the producer and consumer alike. Moreover, the authors suggest
that market forces alone may not result in changing attitudes. While early studies of
individual behavior and path dependency have focused on consumer choices, parallels
exist in water user practices. Agricultural producers in semi-arid regions regularly face
multiple operational decisions that are often shaped by coinciding circumstances,
including the seasonal availability of water. Availability is determined by both climate
conditions and water rights, and the more senior a right is, the less variable water is a
decision factor for producers. Administering water rights through prior appropriation’s
temporal hierarchy creates individual path dependencies reliant on established patterns of
water distribution and use. The security offered to some individuals through seniority in
water rights has led to Anderson et al.’s (2018: 199) characterization of prior
appropriation as a “formidable ‘change-resistant institution’.” Moreover, they attributed
resistance to the expansion of water use metering among surface water irrigators in
Montana’s Yellowstone River Basin to “steadfast commitment to the status quo”
(Anderson et al. 2018: 205) of how prior appropriation law has historically been
interpreted and exercised in Montana (i.e., preservation of individual property rights and
personal liberty in water use).
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Central to our research is understanding the dynamics linkages between
institutional and individual path dependencies in light of establishing new water
reallocation reforms. Understanding these linkages and how attitudes and behaviors are
shaped is critical in policy reforms that are dependent on behavioral changes and
worldviews at the individual level. To examine these dynamics, this research follows
from Marston and Cai’s holistic framework of examining barriers to water reallocation
through the perspectives of key informant stakeholders and interprets their insights and
individual behavioral patterns through the path dependency lens.
Study Area Context
Based on Utah’s 2017 Recommended State Water Strategy (GSWSAT, 2017), a
legislative working group tasked to examine Utah’s instream flow dilemmas concluded
that water banks could serve as a viable policy option to support increased access to
water rights for non-diversionary purposes (Utah Division of Water Rights (UDWRi),
2018). The group’s multi-year effort resulted in the 2020 passage of a bill sanctioning
pilot water banks in the state (2020 Utah Senate Bill 26; Utah Code 73-31). Table 4.1
displays the objectives for water banks set forth in the legislation. One candidate area to
implement pilot banks is Cache Valley, the non-montane area within Cache County that
hosts mixed urban and rural land uses. Cache Valley is situated in the Bear River Basin
(BRB) (Figure 4.1), a closed watershed confronting many of the same hydro-social
challenges as much of the western U.S. (Denton, 2007; Burnham et al., 2016). Societal
pressure on the BRB’s limited water resources has escalated in recent decades from
population growth, land use changes, and increasing recognition of water for ecosystem
needs (Wurtsbaugh et al., 2016; Li et al., 2017, Li et al., 2019; Gehrke, 2021). Variation
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in the BRB’s snowmelt-sourced runoff contributes to management challenges involving
multiple consumptive and instream uses across three states (www.bearriverinfo.org,
Endter-Wada et al., 2009; DeRose et al., 2015; Larsen, 2018).

Table 4.1 Objectives of water banking in Utah as defined in the
state’s 2020 water banking legislation.
Objectives of water banks articulated in Utah’s
2020 Water Banking Act1
Promote (Utah Code 73-31-S104(1))
(a) the optimal use of the public’s water;
(b) transparency and access to water markets;
(c) temporary, flexible, and low-cost water transactions between water
users; and,
(d) Utah’s agricultural economy by providing access to water
resources and income for Utah’s agricultural industry; and
Facilitate (Utah Code 73-31-S104(2))
(a) robust and sustainable agricultural production while meeting
growing municipal and industrial water demands, such as fallowing
arrangements;
(b) water quality improvement;
(c) water rights administration and distribution; and
(d) a healthy and resilient natural environment.
1

Utah’s Water Banking Act became effective 5/12/2020 and can be found in
Utah Code, Title 73, Chapter 31 (accessed August 2021,
https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title73/Chapter31/73-31.html)
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Figure 4.1 Map of the overall Bear River Basin (gray area within black outline) and
the northern Utah study area including Cache and Box Elder Counties and the
watershed’s location within the western U.S. (Map courtesy of A. Welsh)
The lower section of the BRB within Utah (Figure 4.2), and Cache Valley in
particular, provided a unique opportunity to examine the social and institutional dynamics
of water reallocation policy reform within one of the state’s predominant agricultural
areas. Cache Valley and neighboring Box Elder County combined (hereafter referred to
as “northern Utah”) accommodate over 78,000 hectares of irrigated cropland, a majority
of which consists of forage crops (alfalfa, hay) (USDA, 2019). Cache Valley lies
upstream of the Wasatch Front urban corridor (est. population of 2.4 million residents),
and critical aquatic ecosystems within and adjacent to the Great Salt Lake (Downard et
al., 2014; Wurtsbaugh et al., 2016; U.S. Census Bureau, 2019).
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Figure 4.2 Focused view of northern Utah study area, showing major land
uses (red areas — urban/suburban; yellow and tan areas — cultivated and
grazing/pasture lands; green — forested areas; blue — water bodies). The
green outline corresponds to the delineation of Cache Valley in Figure 4.1.
“BRMBR” — Bear River Migratory Bird Refuge. (Map courtesy of A. Welsh)
Within Utah’s portion of Cache Valley, an expected doubling of the county’s population
by 2065 is anticipated to result in further conversion of agricultural land for urban growth
(Perlich et al., 2017). Sharing of the Bear River between Utah, Wyoming, and Idaho has
been guided by the Bear River Compact since 1958 (Jibson, 1991; Endter-Wada et al.,
2009). And unlike most western U.S. watersheds, river operations downstream of Bear
Lake are managed by a privately-owned energy utility (PacifiCorp). Within Cache
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Valley, municipal water distribution is decentralized, and both agricultural and urban
irrigation is provided through dozens of private irrigation companies (Cache Water
District, 2021). The recently formed Cache Water District (CWD) has provided a countywide water governing entity with the means to represent area water interests at the state
level (CWD, 2021).
Contemporary water governance in northern Utah is at a crossroads with multiple
interests reliant on or vying for the BRB’s finite water resources (Denton, 2007; Larsen,
2018). An additional 271 Mm3 is expected to be developed annually from the BRB via
the Bear River Development Project (Utah Division of Water Resources, 2020). The
project is designed to benefit water districts in northern Utah and the Wasatch Front,
including nearly 150 Mm3 for Cache and Box Elder Counties. Project opponents note its
potential ecological impacts however (Utah Rivers Council, 2019), citing estimates of
106 Mm3 of additional depletion annually to the Great Salt Lake.
And as within most western U.S. watersheds, pressures on the BRB’s water
resources historically have maintained a tension between risk of conflict and opportunity
for cooperation. Endter-Wada et al. (2009) traced efforts among several prominent
groups of water stakeholders that transcended prior appropriation’s “first-in-time, first-inright” principle through cooperative sharing of BRB resources during periods of extreme
drought. Furthermore, evidence of collaboration between the federal government,
PacifiCorp, and local irrigators to supply water for migratory bird habitat in Box Elder
County demonstrates the potential for diverse interests to creatively share BRB resources
(Downard and Endter-Wada, 2013).
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Research Methods
This study relies on qualitative data acquired through semi-structured interviews
and focus groups involving stakeholders with diverse connections to northern Utah’s
water resources. This research approach was utilized to acquire rich, context-specific
insights that can provide nuanced information vital for policy analysis. These methods
allow participants to convey their thoughts openly and respond to follow up questions,
enabling for greater detail and unexpected insights in comparison to structured surveys
with pre-defined responses (Neuman, 2011). Data acquisition occurred from July 2018
through April 2019 and followed a formal protocol approved by Utah State University’s
Institutional Review Board (Protocol #9393). Informed consent was received from each
participant prior to each interview or focus group session. Participant recruitment
involved non-randomized selection of individuals based on their connections to water use
or governance in northern Utah. Selection of participants focused on individuals involved
in the dialogue on water banking at the state level, local water and irrigation district
leaders in northern Utah, and water users in the BRB known to the research team.
Additional participants were invited via the snowball sampling method, wherein initial
interviewees provided suggestions of other people knowledgeable of the subject matter.
In total, 64 individuals participated in the study that included 56 semi-structured
interviews and two focus groups. Research participants were connected to water through
agriculture, environmental advocacy, water conservancy districts, state agencies, private
consultancies, academia, the legal community, and government at the local, state, and
federal levels. Insights from those involved in agriculture or agricultural advocacy were
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of particular interest in this research due to the of prevalence of senior water rights held
in that sector.
Interviews and focus groups involved questions regarding personal involvement
with and views on water use practices followed by questions specific to water banking.
We asked participants about their connection to Utah’s water resources, the current water
challenges they or their organization face, their responses to these challenges, and
potential innovations that could contribute to mitigating the region’s water predicaments.
We also asked participants about their familiarity with water banking and how they
perceived the implementation of water banks affecting their connection to water.
Perspectives were further sought regarding water bank governance, including institutional
and operational arrangements, water infrastructure needs, and potential legal reforms.
Finally, we asked participants to offer thoughts on potential hindrances to water bank
implementation and what institutional design provisions would contribute to building
stakeholder trust. The research protocol, including specific research questions is provided
in an online appendix.
Interview and focus group sessions ranged from 45 minutes to 3 hours in length
and were audio recorded for later transcribing. Transcripts were analyzed via a multi-step
coding process (Saldaña, 2015). General themes in response to specific questions were
initially coded. From these results, additional themes relating to the specific research
questions of this article were extracted and categorized in a second coding phase. For
example, content regarding attitudes toward water banking in general was first identified,
such as whether the participants expressed interest or had reservations toward the
concept. From these broad level themes, participant responses were subsequently coded
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to identify specific subsets of these categories (i.e., “agricultural practices” or “concerns
regarding metering”). The predominant themes that emerged in the second coding phase
were further categorized in relation to this article’s research questions, and unique
participant quotes were selected to illustrate the specific themes pertaining to attitudes,
behaviors, or observations regarding water reallocation in northern Utah.
Results and Discussion
The following subsections describe and assess participant responses to questions
regarding water banking, water use behavior, and views on water-related institutions and
infrastructure needs. First, we present perspectives on water banking in northern Utah
that reflect the general understanding of water banks and how the concept fits within
existing water use practices. This section is followed by an examination of behavioral
factors in water and land use practices that relate to the anticipated functionality of water
banks in northern Utah. Then, we identify and assess how the overall social dimensions
coded in the research data are influenced by institutional and individual path
dependencies and summarize their potential implications on the advancement of water
banking in northern Utah.
General Opinions on Water Banking
The Utility and Need for Water Banks. Research questions first focused on
characterizing participants’ knowledge of and potential interest in water banking. Views
on the concept varied considerably. Enthusiasm for the potential opportunity to
temporarily lease or acquire water rights was expressed by a wide range of participants,
while others asserted that the practice would receive little interest in Cache Valley’s
agricultural community. Responses tended to have general alignments with participants’
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connections to water. For instance, interest in the concept was more commonly shared by
those in the legal profession or environmental advocacy, whereas varying degrees of
skepticism were expressed by some government participants. A broad range of
perspectives on water banking was shared by agricultural producers, however.
Practitioners of irrigated agriculture reflected on the benefits and obstacles of water
banking in the BRB that relate to the broader societal tradeoffs that water reallocation
policies must account for in balancing emerging needs for water with long-established
practices. Some participants spoke to the informal water share trading that already occurs
within northern Utah’s canal companies. Data on the actual volumes exchanged is sparse,
however, and study participants who spoke to the issue indicated a very small percentage
of shares are transferred seasonally. Since transferring water is already an option for
many irrigators, the need for formal water banks was questioned by stakeholders within
and outside of agriculture. One interviewee asked: “Is there a big demand to have the
flexibility to move water around on a facilitated basis there? I honestly don’t know, but I
haven’t heard of that… So, I really struggle with what the need and purpose for a bank is
on those rivers.” However, others in agriculture considered water banking as a tool that
provides broader options in how they can lease water, as noted by an irrigator in northern
Cache Valley: “My water can only be rented inside the service area of [specific irrigation
company]. But with a water bank, potentially I could be renting my water to [a more
distant location].” Others saw water banking as a way to protect Cache Valley water
rights in a collective sense if more of the valley’s water is continuously put to beneficial
use and not flowing out of the valley. As noted by one Cache Valley irrigator: “if we are
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moving it around and putting it places where we can use it, we are using it. There is
nothing here for you to come get, because we are using it all.”
Some farmers felt that during periods of average runoff, water supplies are
sufficient for local uses and interest in water banking within the agriculture community
would likely be minimal. Cache Valley benefits from mountain snowpack, numerous
springs, and groundwater sources that supply water for 124 canal companies, 25
municipalities and unincorporated villages, and other independent users (Kariya et al.,
1994). In reflecting on this relative abundance, one participant remarked “I think there is
ample water on a regular year” for local uses. Another interviewee thought that longtime water users who have benefited from the existing allocation system may see water
banks as a threat to their family enterprises, noting “It has operated just fine for them,
why do they need somebody or something helping them when they can do it all
themselves?” These perceptions exhibit how, under periods of normal runoff, the longestablished system of capturing, allocating, and distributing BRB runoff has provided
agricultural users with relative security in water availability. Stakeholders with nonagricultural connections to water, however, saw potential for water banks to fulfill nonconsumptive needs, such as compliance with surface water quality standards, as noted by
one interviewee: “I think it could solve some water quality issues, more cost effectively
than just strict pollution reduction regulations would, so that is exciting.” Other
participants noted the potential for water banks to contribute to instream flow needs while
also benefitting the water right lessors, as pointed out by a participant from the Wasatch
Front: “So it provides a tool to do that that is not controversial, that is still providing
some sort of an economic benefit to whoever puts the water into the bank.” The
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variability in perspectives on the utility of water banking revealed important insights on
how water use in general is perceived in northern Utah and how participants from various
sectors envisioned benefitting from water banking. Understanding the views of
agricultural producers is particularly vital to informing reallocation policy designs, as the
vast number of mostly senior water rights are held and used in the agricultural sector. For
example, numerous Cache Valley irrigators expressed interest in the practice, but only if
it would benefit themselves or other agricultural producers within the valley. These views
indicate that while willingness to participate exists under certain conditions, meeting the
state’s objectives of broader cross-sectoral transfers via water banks may remain limited.
Irrigation Customs and Prior Appropriation. Prior appropriation’s “use it or
lose it” concept has been suggested to promote inefficient water use in agriculture and
has generated calls for policy reform in the literature (Wilkinson, 1989; Noroian, 2011;
Benson, 2012; MacDonnell, 2015). The concept, which is situated in most western states’
abandonment or forfeiture statutes, originated from common law in the 19th Century to
prevent speculative behavior and ensure the continuous application of water towards
beneficial uses (Kundis Craig et al., 2017). The loss of water rights through non-use is
generally rare, however, as most states govern abandonment or forfeiture via onerous
standards for proof of non-use as a way to limit legal or administrative actions and to
protect the water rights of existing users (Benson, 2012; Kundis Craig et al., 2017).
Despite this historic trend in enforcing abandonment or forfeiture in the western U.S., the
fear of loss of water rights as revealed by some participants has led to paradoxical
behavior in regard to prior appropriation’s fundamental objective of limiting water waste.
Agricultural producers shared that unused water is rarely available in northern Utah, as
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irrigators often apply their entire annual allocations regardless of the seasonal climate or
crop needs. As described by one irrigator: “Guys are always pretty careful to use it up,
even if it is watering a stubble field... after they go in and cut the wheat, they just go and
pour the water onto it. There is nothing out there but dirt, but they are setting a
precedence of ‘we use a lot of water.’” Such actions can partly be explained by fear in
the agricultural community of the UDWRi or other users gaining awareness of an
irrigator not using their full allocation. As one interviewee explained: “There is no
benefit to conserve water. If I own 50 shares and I use 40, I am going to lose 10. So, I
might as well use all 50, whether I need it or I don’t. Because the day I quit using it,
somebody is going to file on it.” The practice of using the entire apportionment of water
right, whether needed or not, demonstrates that excess water beyond consumptive use
needs may at times be present in the hydrologic system and could be made available for
other uses with sufficient water still available to maintain existing agricultural practices
while also avoiding impairment to other users.
Participants also shared that a sense of risk aversion towards any type of water
transfer scheme exists in the agricultural community due to state rules requiring
evaluation of a water right’s historic use prior to transfer approval. This process has
resulted in some irrigators foregoing formal water right transfers as the evaluation
process could “expose” underutilization of a water right and result in partial forfeiture.
One participant indicated that: “There is a real incentive to never do any changes
(transfers). Because you could lose in the end. So, I think that is another reason why you
haven’t seen moving [of water rights], because there is so much to be lost and so little to
be gained.”
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Hesitations Over Leasing Water Rights. Water banking has been promoted in
Utah as “local, voluntary, and temporary” leasing in outreach efforts by the state
(www.utahwaterbank.org). Despite this messaging, participants wondered what
“temporary” entails. Multiple interviewees expounded on perceived risks of increasing
dependency on banked water by lessees in the municipal or industrial sectors. One
participant expressed the fear this way: “The bringing it back home thing. That’s the
biggest problem. I’m afraid that once a water right has been loaned to a person for so
long, not necessarily in agriculture but if it went the other way from ag to municipal, I
just don’t see how that could ever be brought back to that ground. I just don’t." This
concern highlights the dueling intentions of stability versus flexibility as provided by
prior appropriation and markets, respectively. An interviewee questioned whether
temporary leases are the best approach to satisfying long-term needs: “So, if you got a
farmer that for some reason isn’t going to be irrigating a set of acres for a couple of
years and lets it come down the river rather than lose it, what happens when he needs it
back? So, the temporary fixes, that is the concept of water banking that I am not sure, I
don’t think anybody has the answer.” A counter point to this perspective was shared by
another interviewee who indicated that the option to even lease temporary water rights
through a centralized entity instead of through one-on-one negotiations could provide
cost savings in the process of finding water to satisfy instream flow needs.
Tension Between Conflict and Cooperation. In recent decades, stakeholder
engagement has become a common component in crafting or reforming environmental
policies in the U.S. and elsewhere (Megdal et al., 2017; Wehn et al., 2018). Water
banking represents a particular form of engagement in which active and ongoing
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stakeholder participation is the policy objective. Yet, as several participants in this study
revealed, long simmering political frictions among some northern Utah communities
must be considered if water banking is to catalyze broader watershed scale cooperation.
As one interviewee observed: “… it is not all honey and roses within the local area,
either. There are a lot of differing opinions… I could give you a lot of folks who don’t
agree with each other in an hour’s notice. So, there is a lot of contention that is built up
within the local communities. They are the ultimate decision maker... it is an emotional
thing, this water stuff. You hear all of the stories about fights on ditch banks and now we
throw attorneys at each other instead.” Citing disputes within his own canal company,
one irrigator cautioned against the assumption of community collaboration: “If you had
one community so set in their ways that they would not budge to allow this other to
benefit, it is going to affect your bank. It is going to have an impact on your bank. So, I
think you need to watch for that, watch for those kinds of frictions and controversies."
Another interviewee reflected on inertia to systemic change of water use and resource
sharing in Cache Valley based on what he perceived as a sense of entrenchment in
attitudes at the individual and community levels. When asked if other policies besides
water banking existed to meet local water challenges, he explained: “I think we are pretty
limited as to a strategy. The first one [limitation] has to be political, because you are
talking about getting a lot of entities together that have been independent for a lot of
years. And when it comes to water, we tend to huddle around our own and aren’t really
willing to open the books if you know what I mean.”
Protectionist attitudes reveal a tension between maintaining local water resources
within existing uses and providing water rights access for a broader range of needs in the
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BRB. Further complicating this dynamic is how lease and rental prices are determined.
Fixed prices can limit price discovery of what different users are willing to pay, yet they
can ensure that water rights access through a bank is affordable and accessible for
interests outside of municipal or industrial sectors. Conversely, unrestricted pricing may
entice greater water bank participation on the part of lessors. Hence, water bank designers
must consider how the “free market,” in terms of who has access and at what price, is
incorporated in the design of water banks. Some interviewees anticipated water banks
serving as pathways for Wasatch Front interests to “take” Cache Valley’s water, as
suggested by one irrigator: “I do think if water banks really take off it will probably be
the demise of Utah agriculture, because I think that the Wasatch Front is so thirsty that
they will suck it all up with lots of money." Countering this dire prediction, however, a
Salt Lake City area interviewee remarked: "This drives farmers and local people crazy,
but if there is not a need for the water in Cache Valley, why not send it down the river
and let someone on the Wasatch Front use it? I think they will change their tune as soon
as they start saying, ‘oh, I can get compensated?’ Right now, they are just sending it to
someone else for free and it rubs them the wrong way.”
Behavioral and Decision Factors Affecting Interest in Water Banking
Farming Practices. On-farm practices and market dynamics can each play a
major role in determining water use needs. Participants in the agricultural sector
elaborated on how cyclical processes in farming create decision points that could factor
into whether participating in water banking provides viable economic options for their
operations. An irrigator noted that the most fundamental decisions in farming center on
what he termed “brutal economics,” and that mortgage payments are what “keep the ag
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folks awake every night.” One interviewee stressed that water banks would need to
provide irrigators with timely response to applications for water leases during the
growing season, noting the sunk costs in crop production prior to planting: “You have to
remember that we’re not deciding to plant wheat until the fall before planting. So, [a
farmer’s] buying $10,000 worth of seed in hopes that all of the stars line up in six
months. So, he needs his water bank to understand that.” Hence, water bank participation
must fit into the financial, timing, and risk management issues characteristic of farming.
The forage crop alfalfa presents unique challenges and opportunities for irrigators
considering water banking. Although its production in the semi-arid western U.S. is often
criticized because of its high rates of water consumption, it remains a cornerstone
commodity in Utah’s agricultural economy with global market reach. As described by
one Cache Valley irrigator, market dynamics and climate would likely influence whether
a producer would utilize a water bank: “And in dry years, it is just going to depend on
how that guy feels about his alfalfa crop… ‘Am I going to buy water for this alfalfa
crop?’ Maybe China is really gung-ho again and they are taking it and he is going to do
it.” However, its production pattern could influence how producers would utilize water
banks. One Cache Valley irrigator noted, “timing would be everything” regarding when
alfalfa growers would be interested in leasing their water rights, or, alternatively, to
acquire water when shortages occur. As a quasi-perennial plant, alfalfa can produce
multiple cuttings annually for upwards of six years before replanting is required. Hence,
irrigators are committed for multiple years to a particular strategy in their operations if
alfalfa is their primary crop. This dynamic is critical in Cache Valley, where over 67
percent of irrigated lands are dedicated to alfalfa or hay (USDA, 2019). This trend reveals
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considerable homogeneity in the county’s irrigated cropping patterns. While perennial
and commercial crops typically generate higher revenues than forage crops, Cache
County has roughly 240 hectares of vegetable crops and less than 40 hectares of orchards
(USDA, 2019). Thus, for intra-agriculture transfers through water banks, substantial price
differentials between alfalfa and other crops likely would be needed to entice
participation.
Infrastructure Needs. In response to the question of infrastructure needs for
water banking in Utah, one interviewee remarked: “it is hard to run a bank on
consumptive use if we don’t have the data and the information.” This comment was in
reference to the consumptive portions of water rights typically used in the accounting of
transfers in the western U.S. Consumptive use values vary by crop type and other
physical factors and are estimated through computational formulas or satellite imagery
(Hill, 1994). Ensuring that the estimated consumptive use volumes are accurately
accounted for is essential for administering water transfers. Moreover, detailed
hydrologic data is required to monitor diversions of transferred water as well as to
shepherd leased water between points of use. Despite these necessities, study participants
described a culture of apprehension towards metering, as described by one irrigator:
“saying the “m” word, the meter word, is not good. There are a lot of people really
sensitive to that, because people just don’t like having people watching over them. I
mean, agriculture people are an independent lot, and it drives us crazy if somebody is
watching everything that you do.” Paradoxically, irrigators were characterized as
harboring fear of being caught not using the entirety of their water rights or shares more
so than overuse, as unused portions of water rights are subject to forfeiture by the
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UDWRi (Utah Code 73-1-4). Countering this fear however, an interviewee with expertise
in water law enforcement remarked that that the fear of water right curtailment by the
state is often overstated, noting “Really in practicality it doesn’t happen very often, but
the fear of it is very real.” Interestingly, participants also noted how suspicion of other
users persists among irrigators, further indicating the independent nature of water users in
agriculture. As one participant observed: "everyone thinks they are doing what their right
allows, but they think everyone else isn’t." Some participants shared from personal
experience that in parts of Utah, how metering was framed could influence attitudes on
its implementation. Interest has been noted to increase substantially after users learn that
metering and monitoring systems allow people to see what other users are doing with
their water, coordinate their water deliveries (especially in the Bear River with long
transit times on storage water), and work together to maximize management and use in
the system (Endter-Wada et al., 2009).
Role of Canal Companies. While seasonal water share transfers occur within
northern Utah canal companies, the informal rules and norms of water distribution can
hinder the ability to quantify volumes of water associated with individual company
shares. The timing of “turns” to divert and flow rates are often loosely tracked according
to some interviewees. Additionally, some canal companies disallow water share transfers
beyond their service areas. Such challenges are evident in the management of northern
Utah canal companies during the growing season. An irrigator described the informal
approach to diversions within his company, noting the lack of monitoring and
disorderliness in the timing of user turns to divert water: “There is no meter anywhere… I
can’t say, ‘well I’m going to lease my water or sublease my water,’ it is just a matter of
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you tell us when you need water and you have it until you are done. But as far as actual
volume of water, there is no direct correlation to the shares that I own and the water.”
Substantiating the issue of accounting, many canal companies do not assign a water
volume or flow rate to shares, and some do not issue shares, as noted by one irrigator:
“The two irrigation companies that I am involved in, I don’t think it is even possible to do
anything [transfers] within those companies, because an individual holds no shares.”
Conveyance system design challenges can further limit water banking
opportunities. A Cache Valley irrigator noted that canal systems generally have too much
“traffic” (i.e, already at full capacity) to where shareholders could not benefit from
leasable water available from a water bank, noting: “there are times where there might be
a stream of water that is available, but another neighbor has already got part of the
canal tied up, so I can’t access that water and there is really not much that can be done.”
Some systems cannot deliver adequate flow to users at the ends of laterals even at full
capacity. Interviewees from one canal company noted that holding senior water rights
does not guarantee all users in its service area receive their apportionment at all times:
“You have this really good delivery system. You have a set amount of water that comes
through. And that is not always what is needed to meet the needs of your farmers… So, in
the end, you have farmers like < name omitted > here at the end of their canals and the
canal dries up. The water just doesn’t make it there. So, he has to add that into his
management scheme of having a dry time in the middle of the heat of the summer.”
Hence, the physical characteristics of conveyance systems can limit the ability of canal
companies as a whole to participate in water banking if external transfers result in a
decreased canal system flows that end up further impairing a greater number of
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shareholders. Yet, if potential exists for the canal company to participate in water
banking without impairing other users, financial earnings from a water bank transaction
could provide funds for infrastructure upgrades.
Dependable Paths Through Path Dependency
Our research has revealed various social complexities involved in water
reallocation policy reform. Understanding the origins of these complexities is essential to
informing policy designs that attempt to modify water user behaviors that are in part
rooted in long-established water allocation institutions and water development and
delivery systems. To illustrate the origins of these complexities and their relevancy to the
establishment of water banks, participant insights were associated with the foundational
sources of path dependency (water allocation law, established infrastructure, or individual
behaviors) that have over time incentivized individual agricultural water use behaviors
and shaped beliefs regarding water reallocation. These associations are summarized in
Figure 4.3.
The 19th Century adoption of prior appropriation in the western states set the region on a
path of allocating water in ways that provided early users and following generations
stability and predictability in their individual water needs. This security in water access
granted irrigators and mining companies assurance of continuous, dependable supplies to
support their investments depending on the priority of their rights. Yet, over time prior
appropriation’s stipulation of the continuous exercise of a water right has generated
reluctance among individuals to seek or participate in formal water right transfers.
According to irrigators in this study, concern for scrutiny by the state over water rights
abandonment has generated an environment in which water right holders have little
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Figure 4.3 A summary of the path dependencies rooted in water allocation
institutions, their influence on individual behavior, and relevancy to water banks
based on the social data provided by study participants.
incentive to conserve water in their practices. Even if abandonment or forfeiture are not
commonly ruled on by the state for underuse of a water right, the fear of curtailment
persists. While this aspect of prior appropriation is often criticized (Noroian, 2011;
Benson, 2012), users putting their water right to full use are acting on what they perceive
is in their best interest based on what existing water law requires. Prior appropriation law
has thus led to water use behaviors and mindsets towards water transfers that must be
considered in reallocation policies.
Participants offered further details on how path dependencies within irrigation
companies are locked into conveyance system designs and operational rule structures.
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While system designs are difficult to change without substantial financial infrastructure
investments, operational rules are more easily amenable to reform. Construction of canal
systems to divert BRB runoff across northern Utah’s agricultural lands was a defining
accomplishment of the early pioneers, yet the established networks of ditches and laterals
dictated who gets water, where, and in what volumes, as conveyance system designs were
built to certain flow capacities. However, for present day shareholders who seek to
receive leased water from an outside source, system capacities likely won’t allow for
“extra” water. And if some shareholders wish to lease their shares, less water flowing
through canal systems can leave those at the end of ditches in even more precarious
positions. Moreover, the informal approaches to tracking and sharing “turns” in some
canal systems can impact the ease with which shareholders could lease their water rights.
To overcome these obstacles, irrigation companies would need to upgrade how they
measure flow rates and timing of use so shareholders would know the volume of water
they could deposit in a bank. While the notion of an irrigation company receiving its
annual apportionment and independently managing distribution within its boundaries has
worked effectively in meeting shareholder needs for decades, expanded tracking of water
use could bolster the flexibility in canal company operations in ways that contribute to
both maintaining agriculture and meeting water demands in other sectors. With over 100
irrigation companies in Cache Valley alone (Utah Division of Water Rights Database,
2021) the potential efficacy of water banks in northern Utah will in part be dependent on
canal company operations and each entity’s willingness to alter long practiced rules and
ability to invest in necessary technologies to track and control water distribution. Figure
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4.4 displays the distribution and names of 50 of the largest canal companies in Cache
Valley (Cache Water District, 2021).
Research findings further revealed ways in which individual path dependencies
affect the capacity of users to participate in water banking. Items displayed in Figure 4.4
relate to the economics within farming operations that can impact an irrigator’s interest in
acquiring or leasing water through a water bank. As described by several participants
within agriculture, cropping practices can create temporary path dependencies in water
needs. Although, unlike institutional-based path dependencies, producers can more easily
control these practices over time to meet changing market or physical conditions.
Economic considerations such as financing machinery or irrigation equipment can further
define the options available to irrigators. Hence, financial factors will play into whether
agricultural producers can transact in a water bank, particularly when specific incomes
are needed to meet loan payments. Users who are accustomed to certain cropping
practices will need assurance of the benefits of water bank participation, whether through
acquiring water or depositing their water rights or shares. Overcoming hesitancies due to
economics of individual producers or prevailing cropping practices will require efforts
that incentivize crop types, irrigation methods, or soil management in ways that are
economically advantageous. Furthermore, the physical characteristics of the farmland
could factor in land use practices, as areas of marginal soil quality could be taken out of
production, and the water formerly applied to less productive land could become a
banked water deposit and provide the water right holder an additional income source. As
a wide range of conservation options are available to producers (Colby, 2017), financially
incentivizing change in crop selection or irrigation methods implemented will be key in
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Figure 4.4 Irrigation company locations within Cache Valley. Note that this map
does not include the entire list of companies listed in the online canal company
database managed by the Utah Division of Water Resources
(https://www.cachecounty.org/gis/canal-interactive-web-maps.html).
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Figure 4.5 Path dependencies connected to individual behaviors and their influence on
potential interest and capacity to participate in water banking as shared by study
participants involved in northern Utah agriculture.
gaining interest and buy-in from farmers who harbor reservations towards any type of
water right transfer. Finally, the physical location of a farm within a conveyance system
or natural stream is a path dependent artifact of past patterns of settlement or property
purchases. Where farms are situated can determine how, or if at all, a producer can
participate in water banking. Some shareholders within canal companies may only be
able to benefit by depositing shares to a bank, but not from acquiring supplemental water.
Moreover, canal companies participating in transfers to outside uses must ensure that
remaining flows within the conveyance system (i.e., carrier water) are sufficient to meet
user needs at the ends of ditches and laterals.
Summary and Conclusions
This research has articulated the challenges of water reallocation reform in the
western U.S. through a qualitative examination of how social dimensions of water users
are influenced by various institutional and individual path dependencies. Following
Marston and Cai’s (2016) call for greater inclusion of social science research to
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overcome water reallocation barriers, we revealed how social dimensions in the
agricultural water user community are shaped by path dependencies within existing
institutions, and how these linkages in turn influence stakeholder interest in water
banking in northern Utah. Key insights from agricultural producers highlighted the
influence of prior appropriation law on individual behavior, most notably with the use it
or lose it concept incentivizing the full application of water without individual benefits to
users from conservation practices. The necessity of full use has also led to distrust of the
water transfer process in general, as users suggested the transfer process can put water
rights at risk if the state evaluation reveals less than full exercise of a water right.
Moreover, shareholders within irrigation companies who are interested in water banking
beyond their company’s service areas face limitations in both infrastructure and
administrative capacities. In addition to these institutional factors related to prior
appropriation, path dependencies that are centered on individual choices include the
economic status of irrigators, cropping and irrigation practices, the physical setting of
their operations, and characteristics of their farmland.
Our research has demonstrated how past choices in conveyance system design
and allocation policies made well over 100 years ago have remained influential on
individual water use behaviors in the present day. From a historical institutionalism
perspective, attaining stability in the water allocation system was shaped by how settlers
confronted the given physiographic and hydrologic conditions of northern Utah to
develop conveyance networks and water user organizations (Peterson, 1997). Moreover,
prior appropriation was a “borrowed” concept following its diffusion from California
mining camps across the western U.S. in the later 19th Century (MacDonnell, 2015). The
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combination of these components, along with eventual federal infrastructure investments
provided “increasing returns” via relatively stable institutions for decades as agricultural
water needs could be satisfied by existing supplies. While institutional stability in the
allocation system had been achieved in the latter half of the 20th Century in much of
Utah, allocation institutions failed to keep pace with the encroaching instability emerging
from hydrologic and societal pressures on the state’s finite water supplies. As lawmakers
remain steadfast in their commitment to prior appropriation, stakeholders at the user and
management levels are left with finding what Campbell (2010) defined as “new and
creative ways” in adapting existing institutions to emerging challenges while maintaining
an acceptable balance between “the dynamic interplay between stability and change” in
reallocation policies (Garrick, 2015). One such approach is through policy “layering,” in
which new formal rules are attached to existing rule structures that then alter how the
latter function (Thelen and Conran, 2016). In the case of Utah’s water banking statute,
the law protects deposited water rights from abandonment or forfeiture and allows leased
water to be used for any beneficial purpose. While path dependencies in infrastructure are
problematic to reverse, new paths can emanate from existing allocation law such as
Utah’s water banking bill and incremental legislative efforts to improve instream flow
access.
To the question of why water markets are not more prevalent in the western U.S.
(Culp et al., 2014), we argue that coinciding institutional and individual path
dependencies have led to combinations of decision factors that individuals must consider
in the water transfer process. As rational choice institutionalism would consider water
markets a pathway to maximum utilization of a water right, our findings demonstrate that
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various social factors exist that constrain whether water users can attempt to pursue
“highest and best use” of a water right or whether such “rational” outcomes are even
desirable or attainable. In northern Utah, and across the western U.S., thousands of
individual agricultural producers each operate on independent paths with unique water
rights and dissimilar economic conditions that continually vacillate in response to market
conditions, climate, and individual interests. Moreover, Pierson (2004) stressed that gaps
occur between the idealized expectations of outcomes of institutional arrangements (such
as markets) and what occurs in reality due to most institutions emerging through political
compromise. For example, state rules governing water transfers and irrigation company
rules place limitations on how water transfers occur. Breviglieri et al.’s (2018) argument
that water markets must evolve from “economic mechanisms” to arrangements that are
“embedded in the social and political context” of a watershed is thus apropos for northern
Utah’s water user community. To be “embedded” in the region’s social context, water
banks must untangle the interlacing of institutional and individual path dependencies in
ways that acknowledge established water use practices while offering new opportunities
for emerging societal priorities. The societal transitions and hydrologic realities facing
Utah and neighboring states are impacting individual users and collective institutions
alike and reversing path dependencies such as those identified in this article are critical in
meeting the state’s diversifying water needs and interests.
Water banks are but one policy tool available to reform components of prior
appropriation and expand water rights access. Their implementation has been in response
to punctuated events as well as anticipated future stresses in the western U.S. (Carney et
al., 2021). In northern Utah, our findings found a range of views regarding the need for
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water banks, indicating that there is also disparity in the urgency for their implementation
and use. Addressing stakeholder needs in policy designs that account for path
dependencies prior to their implementation can potentially help avert negative outcomes
such as what occurred in Colorado’s lower Arkansas River Valley’s water banking
experiment. According to Lepper and Freeman (2010), that bank witnessed zero
transactions despite having state and local entities involved. Because all reallocation
policies are dependent on the cooperation of users possessing senior water rights, policy
designs must satisfy the deeply emotive human element of trust in institutions and other
individuals. Without their participation, meeting Utah’s water banking objectives will
face considerable difficulties.
While limitations exist in the generalizability of this research due to the
contextual uniqueness of watersheds across the western U.S., our findings mirror other
research focused on water user perspectives. Attitudes towards reforms in water
allocation administration found herein were similar to those described by Anderson et al.
(2018) in Montana’s Yellowstone River Basin, particularly in regard to disinterest among
stakeholders in expanded use of metering to better account for use of existing resources.
Participants in this study also offered similar perspectives as Keenan et al.’s (1999) study
on water market perspectives in western Colorado, particularly in regard to fear of water
being reallocated to distant interests in ways that could harm or perhaps even lead to the
demise of agriculture in general.
From a broader water management perspective, the pursuit of water banking
could be construed as a process to assess and modernize a region’s water governance
apparatus. Regardless of the level of water banking activity attained, the policy dialogue
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inherent to reallocation reform draws attention to water conservation, efficiency, equity,
economics, and tradeoffs. How water use is governed in the western U.S. by the mid-21st
Century will be determined by institutional reforms and social investments made now,
including, as Marston and Cai (2016) stress, increased stakeholder engagement. Utah’s
water banking bill was crafted with this intent in mind by promoting user informed, local
water bank designs that fit specific watershed contexts. While stakeholder participation in
the policy design process does not guarantee successful outcomes, accounting for diverse
water user needs may improve the likelihood that water banks or other similar
reallocation tools will eventually be considered a resource through which there is so
much to gain and so little to lose.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As the western United States grapples with increasing water scarcity in the 21st
Century, inter-sectoral cooperation in how water is shared will be critical for maintaining
the region’s communities, ecosystems, and industries. This dissertation involved social
science and policy research to illustrate the inherent complexities involved in marketbased water reallocation using the water security paradigm. Water security, and its
inverse, water insecurity, entail framing the risk of harm to or from water across multiple
physical dimensions (scarcity, excess, quality, ecological) and social issues of equity and
access (Garrick and Hall, 2014; Jepson et al., 2017). This research was conducted in
northern Utah’s Bear River Basin, where market-based water banks have been promoted
to alleviate the strain on water supplies resulting from climatic influences and societal
transitions occurring in the region. Many of the quandaries facing northern Utah are
representative of those experienced in much of the western United States, with multiple
water use sectors contending for increasingly variable water supplies in an era of shifting
priorities in how water is used. Hence, understanding stakeholder perceptions regarding
the governance of water reallocation is vital to informing policy designs of water banks in
which active water user participation is central to fulfilling reallocation objectives.
Specific social and institutional nuances of reallocation via water banks are explored in
three chapters prepared in the multiple-paper format.
Chapter 2 examined the policy designs and applications of water banks to mitigate
various forms of water insecurity in the western United States. First, the overall trajectory
of water bank development in the U.S. western states was assessed, followed by case
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analyses of four water banks in contextually diverse settings. Drivers of water bank
implementation were categorized by five water insecurity typologies: scarcity driven by
asymmetries in access, aquifer overdraft, mitigation of competing uses, environmental
needs, and interstate river basin governance. Early water banking generally served state
or regional scales and focused on existing or anticipated imbalances in water supplies.
Around 2000, however, water bank designs and applications diversified in response to
more specific and localized water insecurities. The case analyses identified five key
insights from assessing the drivers and outcomes of institutional change through water
banks. First, context matters. Approaches to successful institutional change vary and
there is no single archetype in designing water banks. Second, nested rules within
different levels of governance have afforded water banks greater flexibility in
administering water bank transactions as compared to traditional water transfer
procedures. Third, as institutions, water banks can adapt to changing internal or external
circumstances through governing oversight and rule changes. Fourth, time and
institutional commitment are critical for water banks attaining policy objectives. And
fifth, “success” should be judged specifically to policy objectives and should not be
determined solely on volumes of water transferred. Water banks integrate institutional
and market features that serve as a compromise between state-level legal determinations
to reallocate water and unfettered market activity that relies on economic prices signals to
determine beneficial use and access to water.
The focus of this dissertation shifted to northern Utah’s Bear River Basin in
Chapters 3 and 4. The basis of each chapter centered on use of primary data from
interviews and focus groups with Utah stakeholders on topical themes unique to each
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chapter. Additionally, a select group of experts on water reallocation in neighboring
states also participated in this research. Insights on the policy design process were also
acquired through participant observation of a legislative working group focused on
crafting water bank legislation in Utah. Chapter 3 entailed two primary research
objectives. First, we assessed the meaning of water security among study participants
with diverse connections to water. We wanted to determine how interpretations of the
widely used paradigm from actors in an industrialized world setting aligned with
definitions in the academic literature. Participants offered numerous meanings to the
term, but issues of assurance in available quantities of water and the legal protection of
access through water rights were the predominant themes disclosed. The second theme –
water security through water rights – is generally absent in the literature. We argue that
this second interpretation reflects the advanced stage of water resources development in
the western U.S. to where reliable water access is assumed for many users because of
long-established institutions and conveyance infrastructure. Next, participants’
perceptions of water banking were framed within the stakeholder-based water security
themes to illustrate the potential scalar-based influences of reallocation on water security
in northern Utah. Stakeholders revealed multiple ways in which water security could be
positively or negatively impacted by water banks. However, scalar-based tradeoffs are
seemingly inevitable for some water transfer arrangements. While water bank transfers
can temporarily increase the water security for a single lessee and the financial status of a
lessor, alteration of the hydrologic and water distribution systems will occur to some
degree. For example, considerable favorability was expressed toward water banking if it
promoted conserved water staying within agriculture. This outcome could however result

175
in increased evapotranspiration and reduce available water for non-consumptive needs.
Hence, the stakeholder identified tradeoffs must be carefully evaluated in the water bank
approval process at the state level to minimize the risk to the water security of all
interests within Utah’s watersheds.
In Chapter 4, research is presented that sought to understand the reciprocating
influences between existing water institutions and stakeholders in northern Utah’s water
user community and how these dynamics create obstacles as well as opportunities to the
establishment of water banks. Participants in agriculture revealed how path dependencies
resulting from provisions in the prior appropriation doctrine as well as within local
irrigation organizations have led to water right holder reluctance to participate in changes
involving the state’s water right transfer process. Furthermore, stakeholders detailed how
on-farm practices, such as existing cropping patterns and timing of when water would be
needed could limit water bank transactions unless water banks are able to rapidly respond
to lease applications. Stakeholder responses were then further assessed through the path
dependency lens to illustrate how institutional and individual path dependencies have led,
over time, to certain attitudes regarding water reallocation and water use behaviors that
could hinder interest in participating in water banks. Understanding obstacles and
concerns at the stakeholder level and the past policy decisions that contributed to their
emergence can lead to better informed policies that account for individual needs for all
interests and would contribute to cultivating long-term interest and trust in water banking
at the individual level.
This dissertation has demonstrated the complexities of water reallocation in the
western United States that are imbedded in the social and institutional attributes of a
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diverse water user community governed by allocation laws designed over 170 years ago.
This research contributes to the discourse on water reallocation by illuminating how key
stakeholders characterize the extant water governance dilemmas facing the western
United States and how they envision being part of proposed change solutions. Water
banking is just one of many options available to address the clear and present challenges
of water scarcity. The research described herein provides a window into views of
individuals in irrigated agriculture who will be relied upon in the coming years to
voluntarily reduce their sector’s use of water, as well as perspectives from those seeking
access for emerging ecological priorities. While many participants in agriculture
expressed cautious enthusiasm regarding the potential opportunities to temporarily
transfer water for financial gain, a latent sense of fear of how these arrangements function
is apparent in these research findings. At issue are the perceived threats to the security in
access to water that has existed for generations in certain sectors of northern Utah’s water
user community. This sense of water security in part explains stakeholder hesitancy
towards any changes to the allocation system that they believe could lessen their position
in the hierarchy of water access under prior appropriation. The paramount social
challenges to the reallocation puzzle in the 21st Century will be developing policy designs
that maintain this sense of security in water rights among existing users while providing
suitable and affordable access to new water use interests. And as demonstrated in this
dissertation, these processes will take time, transparency, investments, and ongoing
engagement with all stakeholders to cultivate trust and buy-in not only in the watersheds
of northern Utah, but those across the entire western United States.
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WATER BANKING IN CACHE COUNTY PROJECT
LIST OF INTERVIEW/FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS
IRB 9393
A. Interviewee’s Involvement and Water Challenges
We would like to start by asking you a few questions about your involvement with water
and any challenges you currently face.
A1. So, to start off, can you tell [me/us] about your involvement in working with water?
If not specifically addressed ask:
Do you own water rights?
What positions do you hold in water organizations?
A2. What do you consider to be the main water challenges…
… you currently face?
… the organizations you work with face?
A3. How have you and the organizations you work with responded to those challenges?
A4. What do you think are some of the most promising innovations or strategies for
dealing with Cache Valley and Utah’s water challenges?
B. Water Banks
As you might know, last year the State Water Strategy Advisory Team presented
Governor Herbert with some recommendations for addressing the water challenges Utah
faces. Water banking is one strategy being employed some other places and is currently
being discussed in Utah. Water banks are mechanisms for the lease or transfer of
water. They can serve different purposes and be structured different ways. So, we
would like to hear your ideas on this subject.
B1. What do you know about and think of the concept and practice of water banks?
B2. What problem(s) could a water bank help solve and how would it do that …
…in Cache Valley?
…in Utah?
B3. Are there other strategies that you think could better solve these problems?
B4. Do you think operating a water bank is an appropriate function of the Cache Water
District?
Why or why not?
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B5. How would a water bank [in Cache Valley] potentially fit into …
… the operation of the Bear River?
… plans for water development in the Bear River?
B6. In order to operate a water bank [in Cache Valley] …
… what type of institutional structure would be most suitable?
B7. What changes to state water law might be necessary to make water banks effective?
B8. What physical infrastructure might be needed to operate a water bank [in Cache
Valley]?
B9. Have you ever transferred water on a temporary or permanent basis?
How was this transaction handled?
What did you think of the transaction process?
B10. What provisions would need to be in place for you to trust transactions in a water
bank?
(By provisions we mean institutional arrangements, level of oversight of
transactions, methods of matching participants (buyers and sellers))
B11. How might the option to participate in a water bank provide you with greater
flexibility in [your farming/organization’s] operations?
B12. What do you see as obstacles to implementing water banks in Utah?
C. Water Security
Now we would like to talk to you about the concept of water security.
C1. First off, what does the term “water security” mean to you?
C2. How can water security be improved in Cache Valley?
C3. How can water security be improved in Utah as a whole?
C4. Do you think water banks can improve water security in…
… Cache Valley?
… Utah?
C5. In attempting to increase water security throughout the state, Utah could potentially
encounter some difficult trade-offs to protect the water security of different areas
of the state and of different types of users.
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a. What do you see as the water trade-offs that lie ahead?
b. What strategies do you think the state should use to deal with these trade-offs?
c. In light of these trade-offs, what do you think would be the fairest way for Utah
to promote water security?
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Water Banking in Cache County, Utah
Letter of Invitation for Interview
Introduction
We are conducting research on the potential for a formal water bank in Utah’s Cache
Valley. In order to better understand various perspectives on this issue, we are conducting
in-depth interviews with people involved in water from Cache Valley and other parts of
Utah. This research will investigate the feasibility, challenges, social interest, and potential
governance arrangements of an institutionally-managed water bank. We will also explore
how such mechanisms for facilitating water exchanges would impact water security in
Utah. The information from these interviews will be combined with other data sources on
water banks and used to inform public decisions about implementing and designing a water
bank in Cache County, with potential implications and applicability statewide. Research
results will be included in a final report provided to the Cache Water District and made
publicly available, as well as in research publications.
Research Team and Sponsorship
Our Utah State University research team includes Dr. Joanna Endter-Wada, Dr. Lisa
Welsh, and Clint Carney from the Department of Environment and Society, and Dr. Niel
Allen from the Civil and Environmental Engineering Department. This research is jointly
supported by Utah State University Extension, the Cache Water District, the Utah Division
of Water Rights, and the Utah Division of Water Resources. We are advised by
representatives from these partnering agencies.
Research Procedures
The interviews and focus groups will involve approximately 40-50 individuals selected to
provide their insights on water management and the roles that water banks could have in
Cache Valley and the state overall. You have been asked to be interviewed because of your
involvement or interest in water resources in Cache Valley. Participation time for an
individual interview will be approximately 1.5 hours. The interview will take place in a
location of your choosing. This research strategy relies on information from key experts,
and the validity of the findings rests, in part, on the reputations of the participants and the
information they share. With your permission, your name will be associated with the
information provided. If you prefer to not have your name included with the research
findings, you have the option to remain confidential.
Benefits and Risks
Your participation in this research will benefit the Cache Water District and other local
water entities as they chart the valley’s water future. This is a minimal risk research study.
That means that the risks of participating are no more likely or serious than those you
encounter in everyday activities. The foreseeable risks are potential loss of confidentiality
or discomfort during the interview/focus group. However, we will minimize these risks
through the following research procedures. Your participation is completely voluntary and
may remain confidential if you choose. You may withdraw at any time without
consequence and any information you prefer to keep “off the record” will be kept
completely confidential and deleted from the interview records. You may choose to not
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answer any questions you might be uncomfortable addressing (but continue with the rest
of the interview). If you decide to withdraw from the study at any time before it is complete,
all information shared prior to that point will be destroyed.
Interview Permission and Information: We are seeking permission to interview you,
record the interview, and transcribe the digital recording. This procedure will ensure we
have correctly heard and understood the information you provide. The recording and
transcription will be stored with code numbers and, if you choose to keep your name
confidential, it will not be associated with any reported findings or acknowledgements.
Records will be kept secure via storage on password-protected databases managed through
Utah State University. The information will be used for research purposes only, and
information access will be limited to the project researchers. The digital recordings will be
destroyed within two years from the interview date, and codes linking people to interview
transcriptions will be destroyed by June 2021.
University Approval: The Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the protection of human
participants at Utah State University has reviewed and approved this research study. If
you have questions about your rights as a research participant or want to obtain information
from a university representative other than the researchers, please contact the IRB Director,
Nicole Vouvalis at (435) 797-0567 or irb@usu.edu. Obtaining the informed consent of
research participants is a required and important component of university procedures. We
will retain a copy of this consent form in our records and are providing you a copy as well
(it includes our contact information so you can contact us after the interview if you choose
to do so).
Contact Information: We greatly appreciate your time and want to thank you in advance
for your participation in our study. If you have any questions or concerns about the research
itself, please contact either Dr. Endter-Wada, Dr. Allen, or Dr. Welsh (contact information
provided below). They would be happy to answer your questions.
Researcher Certification
We certify that the research study has been explained to the individual, and the individual
understands the study’s nature, purpose, and the benefits and possible risks associated with
participating in this study. Any questions that were raised have been answered.
_____________________________

_____________________________

Joanna Endter-Wada, Ph.D., PI
435-797-2487 (phone/voice mail)
joanna.endter-wada@usu.edu

Niel Allen, Ph.D., Co-PI
435-994-4369 (phone/voice mail)
niel.allen@usu.edu

_____________________________

______________________________

Lisa Welsh, Ph.D., Co-PI
435-797-0922 (phone/voice mail)
lisa.welsh@usu.edu

Clint Carney, Ph.D. Student Researcher
970-222-9166 (phone/voice mail)
clint.carney@aggiemail.usu.edu
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Informed Consent
By signing below, you agree to participate in this study. You indicate that you understand
the risks and benefits of participation, and you know what you will be asked to do. You
also agree that you have asked any questions you might have, and are clear on how to stop
your participation in the study if you choose to do so. Please be sure to retain a copy of this
form for your records.
____ I agree to be interviewed and understand that my participation is voluntary
____ I agree to have the interview/focus group digitally recorded and transcribed
____ I prefer that my participation in this study remain confidential (my name will not be
associated with the information shared during the interview/focus group)

_____________________________
Participant’s Signature
Date

________________________________
Participant’s Name (printed)

_____________________________
Signature of Interviewer(s)

______________
Date

_____________________________
Signature of Interviewer(s)

______________
Date
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Resources Districts.
Carney, C.P., Pierce, K.S., Abraham, J.D., Steele, G.V., Genco, A., Woolf, R.E.V.,
Cannia, J.C., and T. Meglich. 2014. Hydrogeologic Assessment and Framework
Development of the Aquifers beneath the Brainard-Valparaiso Area of the Lower
Platte South Natural Resources District in Eastern Nebraska.
Abraham, J.D., Carney, C.P., and J.C. Cannia. 2014. Data Report on Mapping the
Hydrogeology of the Clarkson Area within the Lower Elkhorn Natural Resources
District Using an Airborne Electromagnetic Survey. Prepared for the Lower Elkhorn
Natural Resources District, Norfolk, NE.
Carney, C.P., and E.P. Poeter. 2009. Development of Characterization Approaches
and a Management Tool for the Groundwater‐Surface Water System in the Vicinity
of Sutherland Reservoir and Gerald Gentleman Station, Lincoln County, Nebraska:
Findings and Conclusion of Investigation. Available at:
http://www.cwi.colostate.edu/publications/cr/212.pdf
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Carney, C.P., 2008. Groundwater Flow Model of the Central Model Unit of the
Nebraska Cooperative Hydrology Study (COHYST) Area. Available at:
https://cohyst.nebraska.gov/archive/cohyst_preliminarydata.html#docs
Carney, C.P., and S.M. Peterson. 2001. Estimated Groundwater Discharge to
Streams from the High Plains Aquifer in the Central Model Unit of the COHYST
Study Area for the Period Prior to Major Groundwater Irrigation. COHYST Internal
report. Available at:
https://cohyst.nebraska.gov/archive/cohyst_preliminarydata.html#docs

Periodical Submissions
Policy Corner/News Notes Article: Water Gets Attention in Congress. Earth
Magazine, August 2009, p. 26
Southwest Hydrology Magazine, March/April 2007, vol. 6, no 2. Software Review
and Rating of RockWorks 2006.

Research and Professional Presentations
Cache Water District (March 2020) – Logan, UT
Water Banking in Cache County
Authors: J. Endter-Wada, L. Welsh, C. Carney, and N. Allen
AWRA Annual Conference (Nov 2019) – Salt Lake City, UT
The Water Bank(ing) Experience in the Western United States and
Insights from Utah’s Neighbors
(Contribution to the session and panel discussion titled: Water Markets
and Banking – Fostering Better Water Use?)
Authors: C. Carney, J. Endter-Wada, L. Welsh, and N. Allen
AWRA International Water Security Conference (Sept 2019) – Beijing, China
September 2019
The Compounding Interest in Banking Water and Water Security
Authors: C. Carney, J. Endter-Wada, and L. Welsh
Northern Utah Water Conference (April 2019) – Logan, UT
Water Banking in Cache County: A Research Update
Authors: C. Carney, J. Endter-Wada, L. Welsh, and N. Allen
Utah Water Conservation Forum (May 2018) – West Jordan, UT
Water Conservation Motivations and Societal Outcomes
Authors: J. Endter-Wada, C. Carney, and J. Thomson
AWRA Annual Conference (Nov 2017) – Portland, OR
Confounding Conservatism in Utah: Strong Citizen Support for
Government Involvement to Confront Water-Related Stresses in a Red State
Authors: C. Carney and J. Endter-Wada
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Role of Water Demand Management Infrastructure: Tapping New
Potential and Assessing Tradeoffs
Authors: J. Endter-Wada, C. Carney, J. Thomson, D. Wuenschell, and L. Welsh
Montana Water Resources Association Annual Meeting (Oct 2014) – Billings, MT
Solutions for Water Resources Challenges – Understanding the Subsurface
Author: C. Carney
GSA North-Central Section Annual Meeting (April 2014) – Lincoln, NE
AEM Mapping of Groundwater Resources within the Glacial Deposits
and Cretaceous Dakota Formation of eastern Nebraska
Authors: J. Cannia, C. Carney, and J. Abraham
NE Assoc. of Resource Districts Annual Conference (March 2005) – Kearney, NE
COHYST Groundwater Modeling Project Update
Author: C. Carney
Geological Society of America Annual Meeting (Oct 2002) – Denver, CO
A Comparison Between Stream Depletion Lines Computed with
Groundwater-Flow Models and a Classic Analytic Method for the
Nebraska Cooperative Hydrology Study.
Authors: C. Carney, R. Luckey, and S. Peterson
GSA North Central Annual Meeting (May 1999) – Champaign-Urbana, IL
Modeling the Groundwater Flow-system and Five-Year Recharge Area
of the Fawn Hills Subdivision, Peoria County, Illinois.
Author: C. Carney

Professional Training/Continuing Education
Water Conflict Management and Transformation Workshop
American Water Resources Association’s Annual Conference
November 8, 2020 (virtual in 2020)
Utah Water Law & Policy Seminar – Conflict, Consensus, and Adapting Water
Law
March 18, 2019 (St. George, UT)
Utah Water Law & Policy Seminar – Water Distribution and Administration
March 19, 2018 (St. George, UT)
Groundwater High-Resolution Site Characterization
March 22-23, 2016 (Denver, CO (US EPA CERCLA Education Center))
Groundwater Contamination and Remediation: Principles and Practices
March 8-9, 2016 (Lone Tree, CO)

193
Three-dimensional Geologic Mapping – Geological Society of America
Workshop
October 26, 2013 (Denver, CO)

Funding & Awards
2020 – USU SA Grad Enhancement Award ($2,000)
2020 – Seely-Hinkley Scholarship from USU’s Quinney College of Natural
Resources (one semester tuition and fees)
2020 – Babbitt Dissertation Fellowship – Lincoln Institute of Land Policy ($10,000)
2019 – USU Graduate Student Travel Award ($700)
2019 – Friends of Great Salt Lake Doyle W. Stephens Graduate Student Scholarship
($1,000)
2017 – USU Water Initiatives Grant (with support from Utah Divisions of Water
Resources and Water Rights and Cache Water District), Student
Researcher/Collaborator (2 years full graduate student support)
2016 – S.J. Quinney College of Natural Resources Graduate Fellowship (2 years full
graduate student support)

Professional Affiliations
American Water Resources Association
International Association for Society and Natural Resources
National Ground Water Association
American Association for the Advancement of Science
American Geophysical Union

Service and Other Professional Activities
USU Department of Environment and Society Graduate Mentor, 2019.
Moderator – Restoring the West Conference, Utah State University, Logan, UT
October 8-9, 2019
Moderator – Restoring the West Conference, Utah State University, Logan, UT
October 17, 2018
Ecosystems Services Endowed Professorship Search Committee. USU Dept. of
Environment and Society. Fall 2017
Volunteer External Reviewer for Utah’s Recommended State Water Strategy –
February 2017
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U.S. National Committee Liaison for the International Association of
Hydrogeologists to the American Geosciences Institute, 2017-2019
Engineers without Borders – Rocky Mountain Professionals Chapter. Boulder, CO
2013-2016. Fundraising Lead, Field Volunteer in Ilam, Nepal (2015)

